In a number of different settings, interactions between clients and servers involve information that could be sensitive when associated with client identity. Client-server applications built on HTTP reveal aspects of client identity to servers through these interactions, especially source addresses. Even without client identity, a server might be able to build a profile of client activity by correlating requests from the same client over time. In HTTP-based applications where the information included in requests does not need to be correlated, the protocol this working group defines will allow a supporting server to accept requests via a proxy. The proxy ensures that the server cannot see source addressing information for clients, which prevents servers linking multiple requests from the same client. Encryption ensures that the proxy is unable to read requests or responses. However, if the proxy and server collude, then neither of these privacy properties hold. Applications and use cases best suited for this protocol are those that have discrete, transactional queries that might reveal small amounts of information that accumulate over time. Examples include DNS queries, telemetry submission, and certificate revocation checking. In some of these application deployments, the relationship between client, server, and cooperating proxy might be configured out-of-band. General purpose HTTP applications such as web browsing are not in scope for the protocol that is to be defined. Broad applicability is limited by multiple factors, including the need for explicit server support of the protocol. In contrast, transport-level proxies such as HTTP CONNECT or MASQUE are a more appropriate mechanism for those use cases, as they allow connecting to unmodified servers. The OHAI working group will define a protocol for anonymization of HTTP requests using a partly-trusted intermediary, a method of encapsulating HTTP requests and responses that provides protected, low-latency exchanges. This protocol will use existing cryptographic primitives to meet these goals. The working group will define any data formats necessary to carry encapsulated requests and responses, plus formats for supplementary material, such as server keying material, that might be needed to use the protocol. The OHAI working group will include an applicability statement that documents the limitations of this design and any usage constraints that are necessary to ensure that the protocol is secure. The working group will consider the operational impact as part of the protocol design and document operational considerations. The working group will prioritize work on the core protocol elements as identified. In addition, the working group may work on other use cases and deployment models, including those that involve discovery of proxies or servers and their key configurations. The OHAI working group will work closely with other groups that develop the tools that the protocol depends on (HTTPbis for HTTP, CFRG for HPKE) or that might use the protocol (DPRIVE and ADD for DNS over HTTPS). The working group will use draft-thomson-http-oblivious as input.