Subject: Re: FW: Exportable encryption & Kerberos

From: Bill Sommerfeld <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 06 Mar 1998 13:01:53 -0500

> Dropping this idea means that US vendors can't ship Kerberos outside the
> U.S. Are you asking us to write off 90% of the world population from using
> products implemented in the US? 

I'm not writing them off; the US government's export controls are.

Moreover:

 - I am aware that other US vendors have received permission to export
full-strength DES-based kerberos v5 in binary form based on the key
recovery "deal with the devil" exemption.

 - there are implementations of kerberos available outside the US from
non-US sources, which means that the ~95% of the world population
outside the US can still get access to the technology; the only folks
being hurt by this are US vendors, and they're hurt by US regulations..

					- Bill

---

From: "Mike Swift (NT)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 1998 09:53:29 -0800

Dropping this idea means that US vendors can't ship Kerberos outside the
U.S. Are you asking us to write off 90% of the world population from using
products implemented in the US? This is not an option - we have to find a
solution.

- Mike

-----Original Message-----
From: Bill Sommerfeld [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Friday, March 06, 1998 9:38 AM
To: Mike Swift (NT)
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: FW: Exportable encryption & Kerberos 

> This would require a new weakened encryption types, which could be
> accomplished by sending just a limited number of bits of keying material
and
> then running that through the string-to-key function (or perhaps an MD5 of
> that material) to generate the DES key.

Time and time again, the subject of a weakened encryption type for
kerberos has been brought up here.    

DES is pitifully weak as it is; Why are we bothering with anything weaker?

While I'm not the WG chair and am thus not in the position to judge
the presence or absence of consensus, I think it's been clear from
past discussion that there are very few other members of the WG who
think that this is a good idea.

Can't we just drop the idea?  Vendors who want to implement weakened
methods are always free to, but I don't think the community as a whole
is served by having an interoperable weak encryption method...
we shouldn't be standardizing something which is fundamentally broken..

					- Bill

---

From: Martin Rex <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 1998 21:05:24 +0100 (MET)

> products implemented in the US? This is not an option - we have to find a

Dropping this idea means that 90% of the world population will have
a much stronger incentive to use strong crypto, because it will be
much harder for (certain) vendors to spread interoperable weak crypto.

But the main point acutally is:  if those that currently have implemented
stronger crypto would have to add weak crypto to become compliant
and fully interoperable with an updated Kerberos 5 specification,
then this it is indeed a very bad idea.  

I'm sorry for having launched another round of "beating the dead horse".

-Martin

---

From: [email-masked] (Johan Danielsson)
Date: 07 Mar 1998 16:33:04 +0100

"Mike Swift (NT)" <[email-masked]> writes:

> Dropping this idea means that US vendors can't ship Kerberos outside
> the U.S.

This is what your government has decided. Go and beat on them instead
of us. The argument that you are losing lots of money because you
aren't allowed to export won't hold if you export anyway.

/Johan