Subject: IPv6 and child pornographers

From: Joe Baptista <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 13:28:45 -0400 (EDT)

The subject line says it all - IPv6 is a great protocol for free speech
and other sorted activities.

---------- Forwarded message ----------

   http://www.circleid.com/articles/2543.asp

   IPv6: In Search Of Internet Security
   October 9, 2002 By Joe Baptista

   My recent articles on IPv6 published this past September 12 and
   25 have left many users with the impression that IPv6 (Internet
   Protocol version 6) is secure. This is a false assumption. Internet
   security is more an act of faith in a complex science draped in a
   religious mystery - in other words non-existent. In my opinion,
   Internet security has never existed. Any protocol can be violated.
   IPv6 has the power to make users' communication more secure during
   transmission. It also can be a security nightmare. So be warned, users
   of IPv6 - it will bypass your firewall settings but it will give your
   users enhanced privacy. But the experts are working on it.

   To understand Internet security it's always a good idea to go back in
   history. The Internet was a military sponsored communication project
   developed under DARPA (The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency).
   The idea at the time was to distribute computer resources by
   decentralizing control and increasing redundancy on United States
   military and government networks. The goal was to prevent a first
   strike from taking out computational and communication facilities
   essential to operations. If the red menace (Soviet Union) bombed a
   computer facility in Kansas the network would route around the damage
   and survive.

   DARPA planners unfortunately were short sighted and did not
   anticipate the technology would become an international standard for
   communications. The community of users and networks connected to DARPA
   were small and trusted so security concerns were a low priority. The
   end result was the deployment of insecure protocols that have kept
   many security experts gainfully employed. Even secure protocols are
   hacked. Today there are millions of compromised computer systems busy
   trying to hack other computers. And many of those busy hacking
   computers may no longer be under the control of the original script
   kiddy hacker who launched them. In fact I suspect many such computers
   are operating independently of a human operator.

   IPv6 does fix a lot of the privacy issues and has some added security
   features that make it a better transport. Keith Moore, a researcher
   with the computer science department at the University of Tennessee,
   points out that "security is not an IPv6 issue any more than it is an
   IPv4 issue - probably slightly less." Moore, a former applications
   area director to the Internet Engineering Steering Group, points out
   that users of IPv6 will have an added advantage over IPv4. IPv6
   transports traffic using the IPsec security protocol.

   IPv4 connections move traffic around in the clear (plain text). It is
   up to the user to ensure traffic is encrypted. Sniffer programs at
   various Internet exchange points can easily intercept most user web
   and email traffic. Cable users sometimes install sniffer programs to
   monitor and record IPv4 transmissions. In most cases they don't have
   the means to decrypt security protocols and they do it mostly for the
   fun and entertainment value. So don't panic, your credit card is still
   confidential provided you used it over a secure web session. However
   don't expect to send your credit card data to Uncle Steve via email.
   If you have however emailed confidential information to someone
   chances are your message was transported as plain text and can be
   subject to interception.

   The industry would agree that IPv4 is a brain dead protocol and those
   predicting it's death have good reasons for their position. Government
   programs like carnivore depended on IPv4 vulnerabilities to be
   successful. Carnivore is a tool that has revitalized worldwide respect
   for the FBI in the intelligence community. The program intercepts and
   analyzes Internet traffic and is classified by the FBI as a diagnostic
   tool. Carnivore is also a motivating factor in the transition to IPv6
   by American, European and Japanese governments.

   Governments understand their vulnerabilities under IPv4; their
   intelligence departments have diagnostic tools too. IPsec makes IPv6
   less prone to man in the middle interception or attacks. User data
   under IPv6 is encrypted across the transmission end points. Sure the
   intelligence establishment has the means to break encrypted protocols
   but that's an expensive affair. Carnivore has not been effective in
   catching terrorists who communicate using encrypted channels. But it's
   been very effective in catching child pornographers that have yet to
   discover the privacy features available to them under IPv6. It is easy
   to envision that Carnivore will become a useless diagnostic tool under
   the new protocol.

   But in many cases IPv6 systems can be less secure. Your firewall may
   prevent access to your Microsoft shares under IPv4 but they will be
   wide open to IPv6 users. Iljitsch van Beijnum a freelance network
   specialist and author of "Border Gateway Protocol" the network routing
   howto manual has some concerns when it comes to security. Beijnum
   warns that many Unix boxes are heavily firewalled in IPv4 but not in
   IPv6. "If you happen to be on their local link (hello wireless)" said
   Beijnum "you can circumvent the IPv4 access restrictions for services
   that are v6-enabled". He explains that in most cases users don't even
   know the box is doing IPv6. User should secure their systems prior to
   turning on or installing IPv6 services.

   On the brighter side of the IPv6 universe, workstations will be easier
   to hide from the evil hacker. An IPv6 allocation contains addresses in
   the trillions. This means old hacker tricks like scanning a network
   will become less affective. When your workstation uses one address out
   of trillions it makes targeted probes a less likely menace to an
   individual or organization. IPv6 workstations, which use privacy
   extensions for stateless address autoconfiguration, will certainly
   benefit. However systems which are using old IPv6 protocol stacks that
   do not incorporate the privacy extensions developed by Thomas Narten
   of IBM and Track Draves at Microsoft Research will most likely be
   targets for tracking. Old IPv6 protocols may publish your workstation
   or laptops unique electronic fingerprint. Make sure your IPv6 system
   is RFC 3041 compliant or else your privacy may be at risk.

   Conclusion: IPv6 is a protocol that delivers on user privacy. If you
   want your enterprise servers to provide privacy to your facilities
   then IPv6 is the way to go. If you want security the best advise I can
   give any Internet user is that you pray and have faith or disconnect
   your computer when not in use. Enterprises, non-profit organizations,
   governments and small business that have a need for privacy should
   consider a transition to IPv6. But make sure you get a security check
   done on your systems. Those interested in connecting to the IPv6
   network should visit the IPv6 forum and I maintain a [28]list of
   providers. Enjoy!

   --

   Joe Baptista is a managing director of The dot.GOD Registry,
   Limited a not for profit provider of network infrastructure, and
   domain names inclusive namespace. Joe is also involved in Internet
   governance as a member of the General Assembly of the Domain Name
   Supporting Organization (DNSO) of The Internet Corporation for
   Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Joe has been interviewed by the
   leading Canadian newspapers, radio and television on various Internet
   issues.

---

From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 10:37:37 -0400

Mr. Baptista,

In reading your message re the history of security and the Internet I 
my attention was drawn to the following paragraph:

As one of the fortunate folks who participated in the ARPANET and the 
beginning of the Internet, I can attest to the accuracy of the first 
sentence. Unfotunately, most of the rest of the paragraph, and the 
rest of your message, is incorrect.

The first crypto-based security protocols for packet nets (and 
devices that implemented them) were developed in the mid-70s, here at 
BBN, and deployed in the ARPANET. In the later half of the 70s we 
also developed the first IP-based end-to-end crypto protocols and 
devices, using KDC-style technology well before the development of 
Kerberos at MIT under project Athena. So, it is inaccurate to suggest 
that the DoD did not pay attention to security concerns in the 
development of IP.

The primary security mechanisms that are part of IPv6, are the same 
ones that are available for IPv4 today, namely IPsec. So it would 
also be inaccurate to suggest that IPv6 offers significant new 
security options relative to v4. Although one can argue that the 
address space capabilities of v6 offer the potential for increased 
privacy relative to v4, even this may not be true in practice, as 
there are many ways by which privacy is likely to be compromised by 
higher layer protocols.

Depending on the type of traffic that Carnivore is being used to 
intercept, I doubt that the transition to v6 form v4 will be a 
concern, absent use of IPsec or S/MIME or SSL/TLS.

IPsec does not make IP "less prone to man in the middle interception 
..." It makes v4 and v6 immune to such interception. IPv6 will NOT do 
this automatically. It still requires user/admin configuration and 
key management, which has often proved to be an impediment, largely 
because of poor management designs/interfaces.

I could go on to identify many more errors in the statements you made 
re various security matters. As the military would say, you message 
is a "target rich environment."  But, I think this ones noted above 
suggest that you don't really understand the nature of security in 
the Internet.

Steve

---

From: Joe Baptista <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 12:32:23 -0400 (EDT)

see below for reply.

> that the DoD did not pay attention to security concerns in the

Steve you took a tangent into outer space here.  Time to bring you down to
earth.  I do not dispute end to end crypto protocols were developed at
various stages in the game.  Unfortunately I have yet to see anything that
actually works and stands the test of time.

You mentioned two security protocols above - well they have proven to be
vulnerable.

http://search.cert.org/query.html?col=allcert&col=certadv&col=incnotes&col=research&col=secimp&col=techtips&col=trandedu&col=vulnotes&ht=0&qp=&qt=KDC&qs=&qc=&pw=100%25&ws=1&la=en&qm=0&st=1&nh=25&lk=1&rf=2&rq=0&si=1
http://search.cert.org/query.html?rq=0&ht=0&qp=&qs=&qc=&pw=100%25&ws=1&la=&qm=0&st=1&nh=25&lk=1&rf=2&oq=&rq=0&si=1&col=allcert&col=trandedu&col=vulnotes&col=techtips&col=research&col=certadv&col=incnotes&col=secimp&qt=kerberos

> there are many ways by which privacy is likely to be compromised by

Thats exactly my point.  I have yet to see anything that can't be
compromised.

> concern, absent use of IPsec or S/MIME or SSL/TLS.

I'm not sure what you mean here.

> ..." It makes v4 and v6 immune to such interception. IPv6 will NOT do

IPsec does not make any system immune from man in the middle interception.
Maybe the transmitted data is immune from your average joe in the middle
but not from those who can and have the resources to decrypt these
transmissions.  That is after all what intel (intellegence communities) do
as a standard part of their business.  Granted IPsec makes it more costly
to view the stream - but not impossible.  There is no such thing as an
immune protocol.

> because of poor management designs/interfaces.

Yes and that is always a problem.  User interfaces are not terribly
friendly.

> suggest that you don't really understand the nature of security in

go ahead - consider it a learning challenge.  and feel free to do so
privately.

cheers
joe baptista

---

From: Keith Moore <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 14:22:03 -0400

>  I have yet to see anything that can't be compromised.

I have yet to see any security measure in physical space that can't 
be compromised either.

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 14:03:53 -0400

> http://search.cert.org/query.html?rq=0&ht=0&qp=&qs=&qc=&pw=100%25&ws=1&la=&qm=0&st=1&nh=25&lk=1&rf=2&oq=&rq=0&si=1&col=allcert&col=trandedu&col=vulnotes&col=techtips&col=research&col=certadv&col=in…

And your point is?

The fact that they're vulnerable doesn't prove your thesis.  If anything,
it proves that they were (a) thought of and (b) designed (since otherwise
they'd not exist and therefor wouldn't be vulnerable).  Also, it proves that
(c) they were generally considered secure enough that it was worth putting
out a CERT on it (if they had been TOTAL swiss cheese, it wouldn't matter).

> Thats exactly my point.  I have yet to see anything that can't be

I am afraid that if you're waiting for "can't be compromised", you are in
for a VERY long wait.  Serious security professionals know that anything CAN
be compromised - the requirement is that it be merely secure enough to deter
an attacker.  For instance, a GSA Class 5 cabinet or vault is rated to
store classified material, but is *NOT* impervious to attack.  It is merely
required to stand up to a certain amount of time (10 hours for surreptitious
and 15 minutes brute-force, if I remember correctly).  The theory is that
if you try to be quiet about it, you'll still be trying to crack it when
the next shift shows up in the morning, and if you brute-force it, you'll
make enough noise that the Marine guard will come and investigate.

> I'm not sure what you mean here.

He means that v4 versus v6 won't matter a hill of beans to Carnivore,
what will matter to its data gathering is whether IPSec or other suitable
crypto is used *on top of* the v4/v6 connection.

> to view the stream - but not impossible.  There is no such thing as an

OK.  I'll grant you that.  However, I suggest you look at the amount of
resources needed to actually brute-force decrypt an IPSec connection
when using the recommended algorithms and key lengths - and then ask yourself
whether your threat model includes that scale attack (hint - 3DES isn't twice
as hard to break as single-DES, it's 2^56 or 72,057,594,037,927,936 times
harder.  Now, if the EFF DES-breaker cost $250K, you'll need that many of
them - which is well over the US GNP.  Which three-letter-agency wants to
spend that much on you, and if it's THAT important, why won't they just
engage in what Marcus Ranum calls "rubber hose cryptography"?

Also, you seem to be confused regarding passive sniffing and what
everybody else considers a Man In The Middle attack, which is an ACTIVE
attack where you simultaneously spoof 2 connections...

I would suggest you read and understand *both* Schneier's "Applied Cryptography"
*and "Secrets and Lies" - they'll probably clarify many things for you.
-- 
				Valdis Kletnieks
				Computer Systems Senior Engineer
				Virginia Tech

---

From: Joe Baptista <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 14:49:40 -0400 (EDT)

> > http://search.cert.org/query.html?rq=0&ht=0&qp=&qs=&qc=&pw=100%25&ws=1&la=&qm=0&st=1&nh=25&lk=1&rf=2&oq=&rq=0&si=1&col=allcert&col=trandedu&col=vulnotes&col=techtips&col=research&col=certadv&col=…

there is no protocol ever developed that can not be compromised.  and if
one exists please let me know.

> an attacker.  For instance, a GSA Class 5 cabinet or vault is rated to

exactly.  anything can be compromised.  like i said it in the article -
security is more an act of faith.  the best we can do is hope for the best
and be positive.

> crypto is used *on top of* the v4/v6 connection.

ok i agree with that.

> engage in what Marcus Ranum calls "rubber hose cryptography"?

I don't think we have any dispute here.  I don't have the budget to do it
- but others on this pretty blue plant do.

and thanks for the reading recommendation.

regards
joe baptista

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From: Jan Meijer <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 11:04:06 +0200 (W. Europe Daylight Time)

> http://search.cert.org/query.html?rq=0&ht=0&qp=&qs=&qc=&pw=100%25&ws=1&la=&qm=0&st=1&nh=25&lk=1&rf=2&oq=&rq=0&si=1&col=allcert&col=trandedu&col=vulnotes&col=techtips&col=research&col=certadv&col=in…

It was the implementation that was vulnerable, not the protocol.

Jan

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From: Lloyd Wood <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 13:55:58 +0100 (BST)

On Mon, 14 Oct 2002, Joe Baptista wrote:
[ http://www.circleid.com/articles/2543.asp in full ]
> Stephen Kent wrote:
[..]
> go ahead - consider it a learning challenge.  and feel free to do so

Speaking of learning challenges, Joe, are you planning on learning
how to write? Let's see:

$ The industry would agree that IPv4 is a brain dead protocol and
$ those predicting it's death have good reasons for their position.

The tense is wrong. That should be "brain-dead" and "its". You appear
to be missing a second "that". (Those are things a competent editor
would fix without a second thought.) More importantly, the assertion
that you make there is unsupported by any other statement you make or
any quotes you provide.

Your article demonstrates some lack of understanding of networking
and security, but also shows that you can't piece together a coherent
argument.

L.

<http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Personal/L.Wood/><[email-masked]>

---

From: Chris Evans <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 08:35:25 -0800

A quick guide to the apostrophe: http://www.angryflower.com/bobsqu.gif

---

From: Keith Moore <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 17:22:57 -0400

> anything can be compromised.  like i said it in the article -
> security is more an act of faith.

no.  just because anything can be compromised doesn't mean that 
everything can be compromised with equal funding and effort.