Subject: Assuring ISOC commitment to AdminRest

From: Pete Resnick <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 12:29:20 -0600

I have talked privately to some folks (including ISOC Board members) 
about this, and I think it's high time to start seriously thinking 
about it:

The BCP is the *IETF's* description of what the *IETF* expects out of 
this administrative function. But a good deal of the structure we're 
describing requires *ISOC* buying into this BCP and committing to its 
requirements. For example, it's all well and good to make 
requirements about the independence of the IAD and how funds are 
allocated to IASA, but given that ISOC is going to be the IAD's 
employer and the holder of the purse strings, it's really ISOC who 
needs to adopt these requirements and stick to them.

Now, I have every expectation of the current ISOC Board that they 
will vote to take on the duties outlined in the BCP (and I expect the 
vote to be unanimous). However, we are putting a great deal of time 
and effort into this project, and changing any BCP, let alone this 
BCP, on a whim would be no pleasant task. I would like assurance that 
in some future version of the ISOC Board (where perhaps priorities 
and projects other than the IETF become more important), we don't end 
up with a mere majority of the Board voting to abandon these 
commitments. I want ISOC stuck with us as much as we're stuck with 
them. :-)

To do this, I suggest that we don't call the administrative 
restructuring "done" until ISOC votes, by a 4/5 majority, to amend 
its by-laws to commit to the support of the IETF as outlined in the 
BCP. Procedurally, I would say that we should add a section to the 
BCP that simply says:

- This BCP becomes effective when the Internet Society adopts a 
by-law affirming the contents of this document.

And ISOC creates a by-law which says:

- The Society, given its special relationship with and financial 
support of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), shall support 
the administrative activities of the IETF as described in their Best 
Current Practices (BCP) number X.

(I have no problem with ISOC wanting a different sort of by-law, one 
which describes the relationship as opposed to just pointing to our 
BCP. However, again I would think that we don't call the process 
"done" until we agree that we've gotten the right sort of commitment 
out of ISOC.)

Given a by-law, if ISOC wants to pull out of the arrangement, it will 
take a 4/5 majority to do so. (Though I have been, and continue to 
be, someone who wants to see those "explosive bolts" as part of the 
plan, I do want them to be *bolts*, not paper clips. This is a big 
commitment we (IETF and ISOC) are making to each other, and I don't 
want it to be easy for a relatively small number of people to mess 
up.)

(P.S.: I will not be speeding in answering e-mail over the next few 
weeks, so if you have personal comments for me, please be patient for 
my reply.)

pr
-- 
Pete Resnick <http://www.qualcomm.com/~presnick/>
QUALCOMM Incorporated - Direct phone: (858)651-4478, Fax: (858)651-1102

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---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 15:07:21 -0500

Pete,

I understand your concern, but I don't think it is necessary.
Worse, I suspect that, were ISOC to start changing their bylaws
in this sort of direction and in ways that would actually
provide the guarantees you want, they would reasonably insist on
reciprocal provisions that would prevent IETF from unwinding the
relationship without cause, would permit them to step in if they
concluded that IETF was about to self-destruct (or fizzle out)
-- see my earlier note on the implications of IETF's going under
--and so on.

Let me suggest an analogy that may help in understanding how far
we should go in this direction.  Resignations of IAB and
especially IESG members on short notice, especially if they are
immediately effective, are bad for the community.  Replacing
such people takes a month or two, work is typically delayed
during the vacancy and again while the new person reads in, etc.
As partial protection against those problems, the Nomcom
typically asks if an potential candidate has sufficient personal
commitment and organizational support to do the job.
Presumably, if the answer is "no", the person is no longer a
candidate.    But we do not, to my knowledge, require either of
the following:

	* A commitment from the potential candidate that he or
	she will not leave the job from which support exists for
	another position in which the IETF work would be less
	well supported.
	
	* A corporate commitment, approved by the corporate
	Board and signed off on by the CEO or Chairperson, that
	the potential candidate will not be fired or laid off,
	with or without cause, and that, even if the potential
	candidate's department is closed or spun off, the
	candidate will continue to be retained at the company
	and supported in his or her IETF work.

I could go on, but maybe that makes the point.

In the case of individuals, we assume a certain amount of
continuing and sustainable good faith and intentions on the part
of all concerned.  In the case of ISOC, there has never been any
evidence of a lack of good faith on the part of various
succeeding Boards in keeping the commitments of older ones.  To
be pragmatic about this, were a new Board to consider such lack
of good faith, it would almost certainly cost ISOC enough in
donations and other support to induce severe harm, which would
be a lot worse for them than the consequences for your company
of suddenly refusing to support your IETF participation.  

Conversely, if you assume an ISOC Board that is suddenly taken
over by Evil Influences (in spite of history, IETF-appointed
Board members, etc., I don't understand your confidence that
they would not either change or ignore any IETF-specific bylaw
provisions that existed.   We certainly have sufficient IETF
precedents for ignoring inconvenient procedures without
bothering to modify them that they might take our lead.

As I indicated in a prior note, while I'm not inclined to lie
awake nights worrying about it, I'm actually much more concerned
about an out-of-control, unresponsive, and out-of-touch IASC
than I am about ISOC.  The IASC is being created by the IETF,
under IETF control, but without firm controls on responsiveness
other than selection of the membership of the IAOC.   And we
have a track record -- with the IAB pre-Kobe and, according to a
number of statements during the Problem Statement process, with
the IESG more recently -- with management machinery of our
design and creation getting out of touch, ignoring established
principles of decision-making, and so on.

      john

--On Saturday, 11 December, 2004 12:29 -0600 Pete Resnick
<[email-masked]> wrote:

> I have talked privately to some folks (including ISOC Board
> members) about this, and I think it's high time to start
> seriously thinking about it:
> 
> The BCP is the *IETF's* description of what the *IETF* expects
> out of this administrative function. But a good deal of the
> structure we're describing requires *ISOC* buying into this
> BCP and committing to its requirements. For example, it's all
> well and good to make requirements about the independence of
> the IAD and how funds are allocated to IASA, but given that
> ISOC is going to be the IAD's employer and the holder of the
> purse strings, it's really ISOC who needs to adopt these
> requirements and stick to them.
> 
> Now, I have every expectation of the current ISOC Board that
> they will vote to take on the duties outlined in the BCP (and
> I expect the vote to be unanimous). However, we are putting a
> great deal of time and effort into this project, and changing
> any BCP, let alone this BCP, on a whim would be no pleasant
> task. I would like assurance that in some future version of
> the ISOC Board (where perhaps priorities and projects other
> than the IETF become more important), we don't end up with a
> mere majority of the Board voting to abandon these
> commitments. I want ISOC stuck with us as much as we're stuck
> with them. :-)
> 
> restructuring "done" until ISOC votes, by a 4/5 majority, to
> amend its by-laws to commit to the support of the IETF as
> outlined in the BCP. Procedurally, I would say that we should
> add a section to the BCP that simply says:
> 
> - This BCP becomes effective when the Internet Society adopts
> a by-law affirming the contents of this document.
> 
> - The Society, given its special relationship with and
> financial support of the Internet Engineering Task Force
> (IETF), shall support the administrative activities of the
> IETF as described in their Best Current Practices (BCP) number
> X.
> 
> (I have no problem with ISOC wanting a different sort of
> by-law, one which describes the relationship as opposed to
> just pointing to our BCP. However, again I would think that we
> don't call the process "done" until we agree that we've gotten
> the right sort of commitment out of ISOC.)
> 
> Given a by-law, if ISOC wants to pull out of the arrangement,
> it will take a 4/5 majority to do so. (Though I have been, and
> continue to be, someone who wants to see those "explosive
> bolts" as part of the plan, I do want them to be *bolts*, not
> paper clips. This is a big commitment we (IETF and ISOC) are
> making to each other, and I don't want it to be easy for a
> relatively small number of people to mess up.)
> 
> (P.S.: I will not be speeding in answering e-mail over the
> next few weeks, so if you have personal comments for me,
> please be patient for my reply.)
> 
> pr

---

From: Pete Resnick <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 16:00:49 -0600

On 12/11/04 at 3:07 PM -0500, John C Klensin wrote:

>I suspect that, were ISOC to start changing their bylaws in this 
>sort of direction and in ways that would actually provide the 
>guarantees you want, they would reasonably insist on reciprocal 
>provisions that would prevent IETF from unwinding the relationship 
>without cause, would permit them to step in if they concluded that 
>IETF was about to self-destruct (or fizzle out) -- see my earlier 
>note on the implications of IETF's going under--and so on.

As far as preventing the IETF from unwinding the relationship: To 
unwind the relationship from the IETF side would take a change in the 
BCP, with IETF-wide consensus. It is exactly that fact, and the fact 
that the current state of affairs only requires a simple majority of 
the ISOC board to unwind, which I think mandates this. Unwinding the 
relationship on the IETF side would be a "big deal".

As far as self-destruction: If such is imminent, I cannot imagine 
that the ISOC board can not get four-fifths of themselves (the amount 
needed to make a by-law change) to agree to rescind the by-law I 
propose.

>Let me suggest an analogy that may help in understanding how far we 
>should go in this direction.  Resignations of IAB and especially 
>IESG members on short notice, especially if they are immediately 
>effective, are bad for the community.[...]But we do not, to my 
>knowledge, require either of the following:
>

I don't think the analogy holds in the least. You can bet that we'd 
be asking the Nomcom for those kinds of statements if there were 
serious money involved in such a resignation. And though I am sure 
all sorts of things rest on IESG or IAB work, we're not talking about 
the potential for millions of dollars that we're talking about with 
the ISOC's budgetary support for the IETF administrative functions. 
Asking someone for a relationship as a volunteer worker is quite a 
bit different from asking someone for a relationship as your sole 
fundraiser and administrative home.

And this would not be asking for an irrevocable commitment. It's 
asking that four out of five of the board members agree before the 
commitment is revoked. I don't think that it's that much to ask.

>To be pragmatic about this, were a new Board to consider such lack 
>donations and other support to induce severe harm...

Indeed. And therefore asking for four-fifths of them to be on board 
to change the by-law seems like not such a hardship, eh?

>Conversely, if you assume an ISOC Board that is suddenly taken over 
>by Evil Influences (in spite of history, IETF-appointed Board 
>members, etc., I don't understand your confidence that they would 
>not either change or ignore any IETF-specific bylaw provisions that 
>existed.

Indeed, if they were taken over by evil forces that could convince 
four-fifths of them to change the by-law, one would hope that we 
would see that coming a long time in advance.

Big relationships taken care of by winks, nods and handshakes among 
friends makes me very nervous. I've watched enough friends get into 
business relationships with each other only to end up in very bad 
places, severely complicated by the fact that they said, "Oh, we're 
all friends here; we don't need to put anything down in writing or 
get lawyers involved." And it's made all the worse because friends 
will wiggle around in bad states for long periods of time because 
they are friends.

All that I'm asking for is a serious commitment (at least as serious 
as us putting something down in a BCP) from ISOC. Asking for 
four-fifths of them (and hopefully all of them) to say, "The IETF is 
a special relationship for us" in the by-laws where it will take 
another four-fifths of them to change that position, seems like scant 
little to ask. And frankly I would find serious resistance to it to 
be a cause for concern.

pr

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 10:44:12 -0500

--On Saturday, 11 December, 2004 16:00 -0600 Pete Resnick
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>> I suspect that, were ISOC to start changing their bylaws in
>> this  sort of direction and in ways that would actually
>> provide the  guarantees you want, they would reasonably
>> insist on reciprocal  provisions that would prevent IETF from
>> unwinding the relationship  without cause, would permit them
>> to step in if they concluded that  IETF was about to
>> self-destruct (or fizzle out) -- see my earlier  note on the
>> implications of IETF's going under--and so on.
> 
> As far as preventing the IETF from unwinding the relationship:
> To unwind the relationship from the IETF side would take a
> change in the BCP, with IETF-wide consensus. It is exactly
> that fact, and the fact that the current state of affairs only
> requires a simple majority of the ISOC board to unwind, which
> I think mandates this. Unwinding the relationship on the IETF
> side would be a "big deal".

As far as I can tell, to unwind the relationship in practice
requires, in practice, an assertion of an emergency and decision
by the IETF Chair, perhaps in collaboration with the IAOC Chair
(if it turns out to have one) and/or IAD.  Doing it that way
would require simply ignoring the proposed language of the BCP,
but there is, unfortunately, significant precedent for just such
actions.  And before I go on, I want to repeat that my one of my
two main concerns is less with your note than with the concern
that we are focusing our risk analysis and protection mechanisms
in the wrong place.

> As far as self-destruction: If such is imminent, I cannot
> imagine that the ISOC board can not get four-fifths of
> themselves (the amount needed to make a by-law change) to
> agree to rescind the by-law I propose.

Rather than debate the appropriateness of various analogies (I
think we aren't going to agree), let's take this up an
abstraction level.  The conventional wisdom about good-quality
standards is that one should specify requirements and behavior,
not particular technologies and mechanisms.   I suggest that the
same rule should apply here.   Suppose you had said 

		"It is unreasonable for the IETF to require a whole
		BCP-approval and publication process to unwind, while
		ISOC would require only a majority vote.  We need to
		work out a model with ISOC that requires a more serious
		process, perhaps a supermajority vote."

Despite some concern about a focus on the wrong risks (see
above), you probably would have heard nothing from me.  Or
perhaps you would have heard a suggestion that maybe a single
Board vote might not be sufficient and that something else --
e.g., approval from the AC as well, Board votes at consecutive
meetings -- might be more helpful than a one-meeting
supermajority.  But I don't know much, if any, more about how to
predict internal ISOC dynamics than you do, so I would think
that the above would lead to an interaction with ISOC in which
the IETF would say, more or less, 

		"It doesn't feel to us that your needing only a simple
		majority of the Board, at one meeting, to blow this off
		is sufficient protection for this agreement.    What
		would you suggest, within your procedures and dynamics,
		to solve that problem?"

That is consistent with the sort of partnership I think we
should be looking for here and which I think the community more
or less signed off on in moving toward Scenario O.

But your note doesn't seem to say that.   Instead, it seemed to
say, at least in my reading, "we should not let this go through
unless ISOC agrees to Bylaws changes that are dictated by the
IETF".     I don't know what the implied "or else" clause is,
unless someone is looking for an excuse to return to Scenario C,
certainly we won't give up on reorganizing entirely if they
don't.

I don't want to see ISOC dictating anything to the IETF.  I
don't want the IETF dictating anything to ISOC.   I want to see
a partnership in which the two organizations work together to
identify and solve problems, with reasonable assumptions of good
faith.  Those assumptions should at least be good for today,
even if you (or we) insist that future behavior is completely
unpredictable.   And, within the context of those assumptions,
we should be dealing with each other on the basis of "we see a
problem on your side of the boundary, please suggest to us how
you would like to solve it or explain why it really is not an
issue".   If, as I have been saying for many months, we treat
each other as hostile parties rather than as partners working
together for common ends we both value, this just isn't going to
work, no matter what words we get on paper.

      john

---

From: Pete Resnick <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 15:04:21 -0600

On 12/12/04 at 10:44 AM -0500, John C Klensin wrote:

>... I want to repeat that my one of my two main concerns is less 
>with your note than with the concern that we are focusing our risk 
>analysis and protection mechanisms in the wrong place.

So, this part of the concern basically comes down to a broader 
complaint about the IESG and/or IAB not following our rules, and 
extends well beyond the AdminRest discussion. I'm not going to argue 
with you about that. I probably agree with you on a host of topics in 
this area. And perhaps that needs to be accounted for in the document 
more than worrying about this thing about ISOC. But I do take it as a 
separate issue and doesn't say anything about whether we should go 
ahead with this idea. (That there are electrical problems in my house 
does not mean that I should fix the plumbing issues.)

>Suppose you had said
>Despite some concern about a focus on the wrong risks (see above), 
>you probably would have heard nothing from me.  Or perhaps you would 
>have heard a suggestion that maybe a single Board vote might not be 
>sufficient and that something else...

Fair enough. I was (honestly) just coming up with what seemed to me 
an obvious suggestion about how to do such a thing and had not 
intended to say, "a by-law change or take a hike". It seemed like a 
straightforward (and legally assured way) to get something like a 
super-majority vote. If the ISOC Board suggests something with the 
similar features, I'm more than happy to take them up on that.

>That is consistent with the sort of partnership I think we should be 
>looking for here and which I think the community more or less signed 
>off on in moving toward Scenario O.
>
>But your note doesn't seem to say that.   Instead, it seemed to say, 
>at least in my reading, "we should not let this go through unless 
>ISOC agrees to Bylaws changes that are dictated by the IETF".     I 
>don't know what the implied "or else" clause is, unless someone is 
>looking for an excuse to return to Scenario C, certainly we won't 
>give up on reorganizing entirely if they don't.
>
>I don't want to see ISOC dictating anything to the IETF. I don't 
>want the IETF dictating anything to ISOC.
>[...]
>If, as I have been saying for many months, we treat each other as 
>hostile parties rather than as partners working together for common 
>ends we both value, this just isn't going to work, no matter what 
>words we get on paper.

This (and statements like it that I've heard from one or two other 
folks) continue to baffle me.

1. Please don't attribute motives to me. I have no intention of 
"dictating terms" to ISOC about how this should go. To up-level as 
you did before: I find concrete suggestions for a path forward much 
more productive than "I think we should do something that 
accomplishes such-and-so. Does anyone have any ideas about how to 
proceed?" My intention in suggesting the by-law change was to give a 
concrete proposal of something that would address my concern. Nothing 
more. And I'm not looking to return to Scenario C, nor have I even 
considered an "or else" clause. My feeling was we'd be able to come 
to some mutually satisfactory way to address my concerns.

2. I find this talk of "hostile parties" just incomprehensible, and I 
know other people who I've spoken to and who agree with my desires 
about assuring ISOC commitment have expressed the same thing to me: 
We are formalizing a relationship. That's not hostility; it's just 
prudent behavior. I find your reaction (and that of others) similar 
to friends who get into a business relationship and then get all 
bent-out-of-shape because one asks the other to sign a contract. It's 
not about distrust. It's not about it being "less romantic". (I 
personally think people who don't understand that marriage is, among 
other things, a legal contract with the state and act accordingly are 
just being stupid.) It's that you don't know what's going to happen 
in the future and you just cover your bases. And unlike friends, who 
are the same persons now and into the future, two organizations whose 
members will change into the future have every reason to make sure 
that the people who had good will in the first place have their 
desires continued when they're not around anymore.

I genuinely like everyone I've talked to on the ISOC Board. They seem 
on the up-and-up about all of this and I have no worries about any of 
them doing something silly. But I would love to see some way for them 
to say, "Even if a handful of bozos make it on to the board, they'd 
be hard pressed to change what we've done here when we are all 
friends." (And to wit: If you and others think that there is a 
serious problem with the IESG and IAB changing the rules out from 
under this BCP, I think you would be nuts not to try to get some 
backstop measures into the BCP.)

pr
QUALCOMM Incorporated

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 18:59:15 -0500

--On Sunday, 12 December, 2004 15:04 -0600 Pete Resnick
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>> ... I want to repeat that my one of my two main concerns is
>> less  with your note than with the concern that we are
>> focusing our risk  analysis and protection mechanisms in the
>> wrong place.
> 
> complaint about the IESG and/or IAB not following our rules,
> and extends well beyond the AdminRest discussion.

No, actually, although I believe that issue is important too.
See below.

I am concerned that the document (and the underlying model)
specifies insufficient controls on the IASC (or IAOC or IAD)
running wild, perhaps with the consent, or even leadership/
direction of the IESG and/or IAB.  That may overlap with your
characterization above, but I don't consider the history of the
IESG not following our rules to be relevant except as an example
of how such things happen.   My concern comes much closer, for
example, to Avri's concerns about the absence of an appeals
mechanism and/or a requirement that the IAOC pay attention to
input.

> I'm not
> going to argue with you about that. I probably agree with you
> on a host of topics in this area. And perhaps that needs to be
> accounted for in the document more than worrying about this
> thing about ISOC. But I do take it as a separate issue and
> doesn't say anything about whether we should go ahead with
> this idea. (That there are electrical problems in my house

I assume you mean "not fix" in the last line above,
And we agree.  On "this idea", our disagreement is
substantially, if not exclusively, about your second point in
your other note, i.e., trying to solve the problem (or risk) you
perceive by IETF's unilaterally trying to impose a bylaws
change, and specific bylaws language, on ISOC.

>> perhaps you would  have heard a suggestion that maybe a
>> single Board vote might not be  sufficient and that something
>> else...
> 
> Fair enough. I was (honestly) just coming up with what seemed
> to me an obvious suggestion about how to do such a thing and
> had not intended to say, "a by-law change or take a hike". It
> seemed like a straightforward (and legally assured way) to get
> something like a super-majority vote. If the ISOC Board
> suggests something with the similar features, I'm more than
> happy to take them up on that.

Then we do not significantly disagree.  If we leave the
mechanism as something they determine, subject to our approval
that the mechanism chosen is adequate (which I would expect we
would be very reasonable about), then I think your suggestion
is, at worst, harmless.   I'm not convinced it is necessary, but
"harmless" is good enough for me at this point.

>> should be  looking for here and which I think the community
>> more or less signed  off on in moving toward Scenario O.
>> 
>> But your note doesn't seem to say that.   Instead, it seemed
>> to say,  at least in my reading, "we should not let this go
>> through unless  ISOC agrees to Bylaws changes that are
>> dictated by the IETF".     I  don't know what the implied "or
>> else" clause is, unless someone is  looking for an excuse to
>> return to Scenario C, certainly we won't  give up on
>> reorganizing entirely if they don't.
>> 
>> don't  want the IETF dictating anything to ISOC.
>> [...]
>> If, as I have been saying for many months, we treat each
>> other as  hostile parties rather than as partners working
>> together for common  ends we both value, this just isn't
>> going to work, no matter what  words we get on paper.
> 
> This (and statements like it that I've heard from one or two
> other folks) continue to baffle me.
> 
> 1. Please don't attribute motives to me. I have no intention
> of "dictating terms" to ISOC about how this should go. To
> up-level as you did before: I find concrete suggestions for a
> path forward much more productive than "I think we should do
> something that accomplishes such-and-so. Does anyone have any
> ideas about how to proceed?" My intention in suggesting the
> by-law change was to give a concrete proposal of something
> that would address my concern. Nothing more. And I'm not
> looking to return to Scenario C, nor have I even considered an
> "or else" clause. My feeling was we'd be able to come to some
> mutually satisfactory way to address my concerns.

ok.  just a misunderstanding in a process that hasn't been, IMO,
quite transparent enough.

> 2. I find this talk of "hostile parties" just
> incomprehensible, and I know other people who I've spoken to
> and who agree with my desires about assuring ISOC commitment
> have expressed the same thing to me: We are formalizing a
> relationship. That's not hostility; it's just prudent
> behavior. I find your reaction (and that of others) similar to
> friends who get into a business relationship and then get all
> bent-out-of-shape because one asks the other to sign a
> contract. It's not about distrust. It's not about it being
> "less romantic". (I personally think people who don't
> understand that marriage is, among other things, a legal
> contract with the state and act accordingly are just being
> stupid.) It's that you don't know what's going to happen in
> the future and you just cover your bases. And unlike friends,
> who are the same persons now and into the future, two
> organizations whose members will change into the future have
> every reason to make sure that the people who had good will in
> the first place have their desires continued when they're not
> around anymore.
> 
> I genuinely like everyone I've talked to on the ISOC Board.
> They seem on the up-and-up about all of this and I have no
> worries about any of them doing something silly. But I would
> love to see some way for them to say, "Even if a handful of
> bozos make it on to the board, they'd be hard pressed to
> change what we've done here when we are all friends." (And to
> wit: If you and others think that there is a serious problem
> with the IESG and IAB changing the rules out from under this
> BCP, I think you would be nuts not to try to get some backstop
> measures into the BCP.)

Working on it.  And agreed.

    john