Subject: Adminrest: section 3.5b

From: [email-masked] (Scott Bradner)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 23:06:51 -0500 (EST)

draft-ietf-iasa-bcp-01 section 3.5 goes on to say:
   Decisions of IAOC members or the entire IAOC are subject to appeal
   using the procedures described in RFC 2026 [RFC2026].  Appeals of
   IAOC decisions go first to the IESG, then continue up the chain as
   necessary to the IAB and the ISOC Board of Trustees.

I do not like this 

the way its written a random person could appeal the awarding of a
contract to vendor and thereby potentially perpetrating a denial of
service on the IETF while the appeal process was being followed through

I do not know that there are no decisions of the IAOC members or the
entire IAOC that could be appeled usefully but I can not think of one
offhand - I think this clase should be removed - or significantally 
restricted in what can be appealed (and I'd say a null set)

Scott

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From: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 23:38:24 -0600

Scott,

> restricted in what can be appealed (and I'd say a null set)

I agree, based on your use of the words "usefully appealed".

I just finished typing the Plenary minutes from IETF 61, where Harald 
pointed out that he wasn't chosen for his depth of experience as a 
contract administrator. I'm assuming this is true of most of the rest 
of IESG and IAB. If we're moving from the realm of appealing protocol 
design choices to appealing contract award choices, we probably need 
to think about this more than saying "just use the 2026 appeal 
process".

WAY too close to saying "just use IPSEC" :-)

Spencer

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 02 Dec 2004 10:12:24 +0100

> service on the IETF while the appeal process was being followed through

Correct. Except that it wouldn't be a random person; it would
be a losing bidder. This is a weak spot.

> restricted in what can be appealed (and I'd say a null set)

But on the other hand we need checks and balances against an IAOC
that is making mistakes. The question is (and it's listed as an open
issue) whether the recall procedure in section 4 is enough.

Maybe we need a much more restricted right of appeal. Strawperson:

Decisions of the IAOC are subject to appeal exclusively on the grounds
that they have materially damaged correct execution of the IETF
standards process [RFC2026]. They follow the appeals process
applicable to the standards process. Matters outside the standards
process such as staff, budget and contractual matters are not subject
to such appeal.

    Brian

---

From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 02 Dec 2004 11:00:48 +0100

The awarding of a contract to a vendor is an IAD decision, and as written, 
IAD decisions are not appealable.

The decision that could be appealed is the IAOC's approval of the IAD 
decision - a subtle difference, but an important one; the appeal would have 
to be based on arguing that the IAOC did not follow the correct steps in 
evaluating the decision.

The principle that "decisions should be appealable" is one that we have as 
part of IETF tradition; most of the time, it has served (I think) as a 
pressure valve - after a decision has been appealed, the decision is 
(usually) not significantly changed, but all parties involved know that the 
question has been looked at seriously. (And occasionally, decisions have 
been found to be wrong and have been reversed - sometimes with the active 
approval of the person who made the original decision...)

In the case where (for instance) the IAOC says that "enough information has 
been published about finances", and there are many people feeling that they 
don't have enough information to judge whether the IASA finances are sound 
(for instance), it seems sensible to be able to "ask someone else to look 
at it" rather than to go to the extreme of recalling the IAOC.

Nit: I think we should remove "decisions of IAOC members". As currently 
written, IAOC members have no individual power or responsibility; all 
decisions are IAOC decisions - and I think it should remain that way.

---

From: [email-masked] (Scott Bradner)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 07:13:44 -0500 (EST)

Brian suggests:

works for me

Scott

---

From: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 06:58:54 -0600

>  process such as staff, budget and contractual matters are not 

I'm sorry, but I'm having trouble visualizing this - can anyone give 
an example of a decision that materially damages correct execution of 
2026?

Have we ever been the subject of a decision, by whomever, that would 
qualify for an appeal using this text?

Spencer

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 14:48:43 +0100

I tend to feel that both the decisions of the IAD and of the IAOC 
should be appealable.

My thinking tends toward thinking that anyone should be able to appeal 
the decision, or any practice including the accounting practices, of 
the IAD.  I believe we are defining high standards of transparency, as 
I think we should, but transparency without recourse can be 
problematic.

I think anyone, or perhaps any group of people, should be able to 
appeal IAD actions to the IAOC.

the chain of appeal could be either:
a. the normal iaoc-iesg-iab-isoc bot
b. iaoc - a joint iab/iesg appeals committee (that excluded iaoc 
members) set up to hear the appeal - isoc bot
c. an abbreviated chain iaoc-isoc bot

As for the IAOC, I believe their actions should be appealable as well 
and should use the same chain as an IAD appeal.

a.

---

From: "Joel M. Halpern" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 02 Dec 2004 19:23:48 -0500

On what kinds of grounds should such things be appealable?
For WG decisions, there can be appeals based on technical grounds or 
procedural grounds.
The ISOC however may only here pure procedural appeals.

I would hate to see someone "appeal" an IAD decision because they happened 
to disagree with it.  That would make the job impossible.
There probably are some things that should be subject to appeal.  I don't 
know what they would be.  If we can not list them, I don't think we dare 
create an appeal process.
The IADs job is administration.  We need to hire an IAD and let him do his 
job with sufficient oversight / review (that's what the IAOC is for.)

Note that if the IAD decisions are sufficiently transparent, then if the 
community really dislikes the decisions, then the community leadership will 
look into better directing or if necessary replacing the IAD.

I have even more trouble seeing how someone would end up appealing an IAOC 
"decision" since their primary job is oversight.  I presume that they will 
have decisions to make over and above oversight.  But "appealing" most of 
those would produce very strange results.

Note that there are many things in our process that can not be 
appealed.  The IESG decides how many areas to have.  It decides what areas 
different working groups belong in.  It needs to make those decisions 
(usually merely by living with the status quo) in order to function.

Transparency of decisions does require appealability.  Most government 
transparency does not lead to appeals.  There are specific legal grounds 
for "adjusting" government decisions.  Not "anything can be appealed".

At 08:48 AM 12/2/2004, [email-masked] wrote:
>I tend to feel that both the decisions of the IAD and of the IAOC should 
>be appealable.
>
>My thinking tends toward thinking that anyone should be able to appeal the 
>decision, or any practice including the accounting practices, of the 
>IAD.  I believe we are defining high standards of transparency, as I think 
>we should, but transparency without recourse can be problematic.
>
>I think anyone, or perhaps any group of people, should be able to appeal 
>IAD actions to the IAOC.
>
>b. iaoc - a joint iab/iesg appeals committee (that excluded iaoc members) 
>set up to hear the appeal - isoc bot
>As for the IAOC, I believe their actions should be appealable as well and 
>should use the same chain as an IAD appeal.
>
>a.
>
>

---

From: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 23:33:50 -0600

Agree with Joel here.

> I would hate to see someone "appeal" an IAD decision because they 
> happened to disagree with it.  That would make the job impossible.
> There probably are some things that should be subject to appeal.  I 
> don't know what they would be.  If we can not list them, I don't 
> think we dare create an appeal process.
> The IADs job is administration.  We need to hire an IAD and let him 
> do his job with sufficient oversight / review (that's what the IAOC 
> is for.)
>
> Note that if the IAD decisions are sufficiently transparent, then if 
> the community really dislikes the decisions, then the community 
> leadership will look into better directing or if necessary replacing 
> the IAD.

I think this is where Klensin usually says, "or the community will 
look into better directing or if necessary replacing the community 
leadership". I happen to like this idea, because I'd rather see one or 
two blow-ups (and we don't have many) compared to endless 
second-guessing by random IETF participants at the detailed level. If 
the IAD really blows it and the community leadership doesn't act, keep 
those cards and letters coming in to [email-masked]...

Bradner is fond of pointing out that we have no admission controls on 
Internet Drafts, but since oversight will almost certainly be based on 
judgement and taste, there had better be admission controls on appeals 
of oversight. If it's as easy to appeal an IAD decision as to post to 
[email-masked] (for example), that may not be a good thing.

Spencer

---

From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2004 09:19:26 +0100

In some other argument in some alternate universe, I said about the appeals 
issue:

> I see three alternatives:
>
> - Individual decisions of the IAOC cannot be appealed/reviewed by anyone
> - We invent an entirely new process from scratch just for IAOC matters
> - We funnel appeals against IAOC into the existing appeals process
>
> I dislike the first and second choices (the first because it raises the
> risk that one will have to resort to the recall "control"; the second
> because inventing new process mechanism is *hard*), so by Hobson's
> choice, I like the third.

A theory....

if "decisions of the IAOC can be appealed" rather reads:
----------------------------------------------------------
If someone believes that the IAOC has violated the IAOC rules and 
procedures, he or she can ask the IETF leadership to investigate the 
matter, using the same procedure as is used for appeals of procedural 
issues in the IETF, starting with the IESG.

If the IESG, IAB or the ISOC BoT find that procedures are violated, they 
may advise the IAOC, but does not have authority to overturn or change a 
decision.
----------------------------------------------------------

I remember that 2026 rather carefully circumscribed the power of the 
appeals process - the IAB can nullify an IESG decision, but cannot make the 
IESG make a different one. In this case, I think that maybe the process 
should be even more circumscribed - if the decision is "hire an IAD", and 
the appeal is something like "you made the right choice, but did not file 
proper paperwork", nullifying the hire would make the situation for the 
newly hired IAD quite confusing.

Does this make some kind of sense?

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2004 10:49:21 +0100

I agree with Joel, I think.

The IAD is a manager. When you disagree with a manager's decision,
you complain to the next manager up (the IAOC). We don't need
to write that down.

The IAOC is a community appointed body - so we do need a
community process; that's either a recall, or posibly a restricted
right of appeal (the othe sub-thread).

    Brian

Joel M. Halpern wrote:
> don't know what they would be.  If we can not list them, I don't think 
> we dare create an appeal process.
> The IADs job is administration.  We need to hire an IAD and let him do 
> his job with sufficient oversight / review (that's what the IAOC is for.)
> 
> community really dislikes the decisions, then the community leadership 
> will look into better directing or if necessary replacing the IAD.
> 
> I have even more trouble seeing how someone would end up appealing an 
> IAOC "decision" since their primary job is oversight.  I presume that 
> they will have decisions to make over and above oversight.  But 
> "appealing" most of those would produce very strange results.
> 
> appealed.  The IESG decides how many areas to have.  It decides what 
> areas different working groups belong in.  It needs to make those 
> decisions (usually merely by living with the status quo) in order to 
> function.
> 
>> I think we should, but transparency without recourse can be problematic.
>>

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2004 10:51:40 +0100

Spencer Dawkins wrote:
> I'm sorry, but I'm having trouble visualizing this - can anyone give an 
> example of a decision that materially damages correct execution of 2026?
> 

Well, suppose the IAOC decided, on financial grounds, to abolish
Draft Standard and Standard RFCs because they cost too much to
process? Or more plausibly, to stop all RFC editing for 6 months
due to a budget crisis?

    Brian

---

From: [email-masked] (Scott Bradner)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 07:24:09 -0500 (EST)

Harald sez:

this sort of wording halps deal with the worry I had in that an appeal
will not stop the IETF from working and restricts the appeals to
those that relate to violating "rules and procedures" and does not
support the idea of allowing an appeal of a decision to hire
a particular vendor just because someone did not like the vendor
or thought they could do something cheaper

Scott

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 13:48:37 +0100

Seems like a reasonable way to approach it.

a.

On 3 dec 2004, at 09.19, Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote:

> In some other argument in some alternate universe, I said about the 
> appeals issue:
>
> If the IESG, IAB or the ISOC BoT find that procedures are violated, 
> they may advise the IAOC, but does not have authority to overturn or 
> change a decision.
> appeals process - the IAB can nullify an IESG decision, but cannot 
> make the IESG make a different one. In this case, I think that maybe 
> the process should be even more circumscribed - if the decision is 
> "hire an IAD", and the appeal is something like "you made the right 
> choice, but did not file proper paperwork", nullifying the hire would 
> make the situation for the newly hired IAD quite confusing.
>

---

From: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 07:05:18 -0600

Brian, thanks for providing some scenarios here. Very helpful for 
those of us who haven't been on IESG/IAB/ISOC BoT, and are trying to 
visualize what the words mean.

I think Harald's followup is helpful here - the existing IESG/IAB are 
already part of the "appeals from the community" food chain, and if we 
get as far as "IAD makes horrible decision that neither IESG nor IAB 
nor the ISOC BoT think is horrible decision", having individuals 
continue to pursue an appeal is probably fruitless anyway ...

Please see notes inline.

Spencer

From: "Brian E Carpenter" <[email-masked]>

>> I'm sorry, but I'm having trouble visualizing this - can anyone 
>> give an example of a decision that materially damages correct 
>> execution of 2026?
>>
>> Have we ever been the subject of a decision, by whomever, that 
>> would qualify for an appeal using this text?
>

I Would Have Thought that the first possibility would be Out of Scope 
for the IAOC (too much direct fiddling with the standards process that 
they aren't supposed to be directly fiddling with).

I can imagine the second possibility to be (as you say) more 
plausible, but hopefully the IESG and/or IAB would think this was a 
bad thing (if there were useful alternatives that hadn't been explored 
with IOAC), so having the leadership tell IOAC "please rejoin the real 
world" is probably appropriate.

The second scenario is interesting, because presumably if IAOC says 
"we can't afford to do this", IETF could not reasonably say "you have 
to do it whether you can afford to do this or not". If IETF says "that 
really matters, and we're willing to help you identify stuff that 
matters less so you CAN afford to do what really matters", that seems 
more reasonable to me.

IMHO.

Spencer

---

From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2004 10:28:52 -0500

>>>>> "Harald" == Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]> writes:

    Harald> In some other argument in some alternate universe, I said
    Harald> about the appeals issue:

    >> - Individual decisions of the IAOC cannot be appealed/reviewed
    >> by anyone - We invent an entirely new process from scratch just
    >> for IAOC matters - We funnel appeals against IAOC into the
    >> existing appeals process
    >> 
    >> I dislike the first and second choices (the first because it
    >> raises the risk that one will have to resort to the recall
    >> "control"; the second because inventing new process mechanism
    >> is *hard*), so by Hobson's choice, I like the third.

    Harald> A theory....

I agree.  In decreasing order of preference:

1) Allow decisions to be appealed but allow the bodies to which
   appeals are made quickly decide not to accept an appeal and to
   establish procedures for avoiding being swamped with appeals.

2) Allow appeals to be made but set some bar for an appeal; perhaps
   appeals from IAOC members are always accepted, but appeals from the
   community require say 10 signatures.

3) Significantly limit appeals process; restrictions on only
   appealing process issues, appeals are advisory, etc.

I'd rather end up having to revise the appeals process because it is a
denial of service than to regret not having the mechanism when it is
needed.

We do probably want text in the document that makes it clear decisions
cannot be overturned once steps like signing contracts or hiring
people have happened.

--Sam

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 21:07:55 +0100

>    community require say 10 signatures.

Since the IAOC is the oversight body, why would they need to appeal the 
actions of the IAD?  Don't they just have the right of adjudication of 
any process failure by IAD ?

And I don't think we want to get into a situation where we have one 
member of the IAOC appealing the actions of the IAOC.

BTW, I was just rereading the formulation sent by Harald.  the one I 

> they may advise the IAOC, but does not have authority to overturn or 

while it makes sense for the IAOC, it does not cover someone, not from 
the IAOC, appealing a procedural issue of the IAD.  I think there needs 
to be a way for someone to initiate an appeal with the IAOC against the 
IAD.

a.

---

From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2004 16:44:28 -0500

>>>>> "avri" == avri  <[email-masked]> writes:

    avri> And I don't think we want to get into a situation where we
    avri> have one member of the IAOC appealing the actions of the
    avri> IAOC.

I do.  Or rather in cases where that happens, I'd treat the appeal
very seriously.  Being reasonable is one of the criteria we use for
selecting our leadership.  If that leadership still feels a decision
is worth appealing even knowing the consequences and pain of such an
appeal, then I'm very interested in what they have to say.

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 23:03:37 +0100

OK, I am open to the idea.  And I suppose that the current appeal 
mechanisms would allow it.

But in that case I do have a problem with making the barrier higher for 
appeals originating from a non IOAC member.  While I can see arguments 
for not removing an IAOC's member's right of appeal, I don't see any 
arguments that should give them any greater right of appeal.  I.e. I 
would have difficulty supporting a mechanism that weighed 1 IAOC member 
versus 10 non members as suggested in your original message.

> Allow appeals to be made but set some bar for an appeal; perhaps

a.

---

From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2004 17:11:11 -0500

>>>>> "avri" == avri  <[email-masked]> writes:

    avri> OK, I am open to the idea.  And I suppose that the current
    avri> appeal mechanisms would allow it.

    avri> But in that case I do have a problem with making the barrier
    avri> higher for appeals originating from a non IOAC member.
    avri> While I can see arguments for not removing an IAOC's
    avri> member's right of appeal, I don't see any arguments that
    avri> should give them any greater right of appeal.  I.e. I would
    avri> have difficulty supporting a mechanism that weighed 1 IAOC
    avri> member versus 10 non members as suggested in your original
    avri> message.

The reason you want to require say 10 signatures is because you want
to avoid a denial of service attack on the process.  You don't want
someone who lost a contract appealing unless there were significant
process irregularities.

My assumption is that if the members of the IAOC want to gum up the
works with useless appeals, you might as well get the recall petition
started.

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 2004 10:39:27 +0100

>   if "decisions of the IAOC can be appealed" rather reads:

True, but it still leaves the field rather open - are you sure we shouldn't
include a limitation to matters affecting the standards process?

    Brian

---

From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 2004 10:57:13 +0100

> include a limitation to matters affecting the standards process?

I am pretty sure I wouldn't want that limitation - since the IAOC's only 
business is supporting the standards process, it's not clear that there is 
anything the IAOC can do that can't be constructed as affecting the 
standards process.
There are cases (instance off the top of my head: IAOC failing to make its 
decisions public) that would (IMHO) qualify for appeals, and where it would 
not be possible to tell whether this affects the standards process directly 
or not before correcting the first problem.

And remember - in the text above, the only power the appeals bodies has is 
to make a rather public statement that the IAOC has overstepped its rules. 
That limits the power of an appeal as a DoS attack on the IAOC - it's up to 
the appealed-to bodies to make sure they don't get a DoS attack.....

                     Harald