Subject: RE: Last Call: 'Experimental Procedure for Long Term Suspensions from Mailing Lists' to Experimental RFC

From: "Margaret Wasserman" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 14:42:45 -0600

I know that these comments are late for IETF LC, but Brian Carpenter
indicated that I should share them here, anyway...

I generally support publication of this draft as an Experimental RFC, and I
hope that the IESG will use this mechanism to support more moderate and more
effective mailing list control over the next 18 months.  I consider this a
good stop-gap measure to provide the IESG with more flexibility while we
take longer-term steps to determine what type(s) of mailing list control are
acceptable and reasonable for use within the IETF, and until we can update
our BCPs to reflect those decisions.  This experiment will also give us an
opportunity to try some different mechanisms for mailing list management and
to gain valuable experience regarding what works and what doesn't.

During the Gen Area meeting today, it was asserted that if this experiment
is successful, this document might become a BCP essentially as written.  I
did not realize that was being considered until we got to the Gen Area
meeting, and while I consider it reasonable to offer some relief for an
18-month period while we determine what else we should do, I have some major
concerns about the idea that we would be running this experiment with a goal
of making this particular draft a BCP.

First, I am not sure how/if the community will have enough visibility into
the results of this experiment to reasonably determine whether it has been
successful.  Will the IESG be expected to provide any reports on which types
of experimental mailing list control do/don't work?  Do we have any
measures, even subjective ones, that could be used to determine whether
things get better or worse during the period of this experiment?

Also, I don't think that it is a good idea to effectively give the IESG
absolute, unilateral control of our mailing list management, including the
discretion to use different rules for different lists and change those rules
over time. 

To put this in the terms that Brian defined in the Gen Area meeting (see his
slides in the proceedings if you weren't there), this document gives the
IESG broad discretion over both the process and procedures that will be used
for IETF mailing list control, and it does not assert any principles that
should be used to guide those processes and procedures.  

Every situation is different.  So, IMO, it is important to provide the IESG
with substantial discretion to determine the right types of mailing list
control for each situation.  I believe that our current BCPs are much too
restrictive in this regard.

However, we also need to remember that these cases are highly emotionally
charged, and often involve well-established IETF participants on one side,
such as WG chairs and ADs, and less well-established participants on the
other.  There are a lot of things that we hope that our WG chairs and
mailing list administrators will try before considering a suspension of
posting priveleges, such as meeting with the individual(s) involved and
trying to work through the issues that are causing disruption.  ADs also
tend to get involved in those discussions, and by the time an individual
situation comes to the attention of the IESG, the WG chairs and ADs involved
may be tired of the issue, frustrated or angry with the offending
participant and/or impatient for action to be taken.  The involved ADs may
also feel that a negative decision on the proposed action may be seen as
insulting or insensitive to the WG chairs being affected by a participant's
behaviour. It is not expected that the involved ADs will recuse themselves
from discussion or voting on these issues, and it is quite possible (I don't
think it has happened, but it could happen) for these factors to lead to a
lynch mob mentality. 

Because of the emotional nature of these situations, I think that we need
some well-understood principles and processes to guide the actions of the
IESG in these situations, and to provide some framework for appeals by the
targets of these actions in the event that those principles and processes
are violated.

So, I think that the community needs to determine the right balance between
defined processes and IESG discretion, and I personally think that this
document errs too far on the side of complete IESG discretion than would be
appropriate for a long term solution.

Margaret

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---

From: John Leslie <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 09:57:57 -0500

(Though I agree with most of what Harald said, I will respond on-list
only to Margaret.)

Margaret Wasserman <[email-masked]> wrote:
>  
> I generally support publication of this draft as an Experimental RFC,

   I was never able to "support" it; but until the GENAREA meeting, I
regarded it as a "necessary evil" and was careful to not obstruct it.
(I must immediately point out that good people _often_ propose a
"necessary evil", and I am 100% convinced Sam is a good person.)

> and I hope that the IESG will use this mechanism to support more
> moderate and more effective mailing list control over the next 18
> months.

   It would be far more productive for IESG to publicly state that
they will entertain no more BCP83 indefinite-suspensions until an
acceptable alternative is tried. (And there's a very obvious alternative:
returning to the increasing-length suspensions that "inadvertently"
disappeared during the adoption of BCP83.

   The IESG should do this, BTW, in self-defense against the DoS attack
which BCP83 is becoming against the IESG itself.

   To adopt Sam's proposal, IMHO, would open the IESG to an _additional_
level of DoS attacks against their actual functions. (I could never,
BTW, have raised my hand to Brian's question, "Who thinks this is a bad
idea?" because almost everyone would perceive that as a lack of trust
of the current IESG members.)

>  I consider this a good stop-gap measure to provide the IESG with more
> flexibility while we take longer-term steps to determine what type(s)
> of mailing list control are acceptable and reasonable for use within
> the IETF, and until we can update our BCPs to reflect those decisions.

   I can't think of any good way to say what needs to be said here. :^(

   Let me try this one:

   (Preface this with a disclaimer: I am a stauch Republican, strongly
committed to supporting George Bush for the remainder of his term.)

   There are a lot of Americans who realize the dangers inherent in
the so-called "Patriot Act". "George the Second" found himself asking
for powers he must have known would be abused, and IMHO proposed the
"Patriot Act" as a "necessary evil". It was by no means the first time
such a response to a perceived threat has happened. It's not even the
first time in the rather short history of the United States. I suggest
thinking back to the Spanish Inquisition...

   Please don't forget that the "Patriot Act" was adopted as a temporary
"emergency measure". Everyone now recognizes that there's no possibility
it will go away during George Bush's term in office. The "temporary"
has a long history of outliving the "permanent", especially in what we
like to call "representative" bodies.

   My point is, there's nothing in Sam's proposal to ensure that the
"experiments" which it might produce will be "more moderate".

   Let me repeat my point: However much Margaret may "hope that the
IESG will use this mechanism to support more moderate... measures",
there's nothing in Sam's proposal which ensures that.

   I see a _lot_ of sentiment for _less_ moderate measures. I see
every reason for the IESG to adopt them "as experiments" in self-defense
against the DoS which BCP83 represents. I see "going back to BCP83" as
so unpleasant to IESG members that the "experiments" will be extended.

> This experiment will also give us an opportunity to try some different
> mechanisms for mailing list management and to gain valuable experience
> regarding what works and what doesn't.

   We don't need Sam's proposal in order to do this: we only need to
write up a mechanism in terms of an experiment, and agree to try it as
an individual experiment.

   Sam's proposal is, in essence, to turn the IESG into a "representative"
legislative body. IESG members, if they don't instinctively realize how
much of a DoS against their proper functions this may be, should look
carefully at existing "representative" legislative bodies and ask folks
who have served on them what it's really like.

> During the Gen Area meeting today, it was asserted that if this
> experiment is successful, this document might become a BCP essentially
> as written... I have some major concerns about the idea that we would
> be running this experiment with a goal of making this particular draft
> a BCP.

   I'm _very_ glad to hear that.

> First, I am not sure how/if the community will have enough visibility
> into the results of this experiment to reasonably determine whether
> it has been successful.

   That is an unknown, certainly. I would predict that unless somebody
outside the IESG has specific reporting responsibility, we won't.

> Will the IESG be expected to provide any reports on which types of
> experimental mailing list control do/don't work?

   That, alas, doesn't really matter. The IESG will _not_ have the time
to produce meaningful reports. :^(

> Do we have any measures, even subjective ones, that could be used to
> determine whether things get better or worse during the period of
> this experiment?

   I can guarantee a constituency which will consider _any_ increase
in banning to be "better". I wish I could guarantee the existing
constituency which considers _any_ increase in banning to be "worse"
will stay around. :^(

   We certainly do _not_ have consensus on any such measures.

> Also, I don't think that it is a good idea to effectively give the
> IESG absolute, unilateral control of our mailing list management,

   It is a bad idea, simply from an information-theory standpoint.

> including the discretion to use different rules for different lists
> and change those rules over time. 

   But _somebody_ (or some body) needs to have that discretion.
There are too many different types of lists for a single set of rules
to make sense.

> To put this in the terms that Brian defined in the Gen Area meeting
> (see his slides in the proceedings if you weren't there), this
> document gives the IESG broad discretion over both the process and
> procedures that will be used for IETF mailing list control, and it
> does not assert any principles that should be used to guide those
> processes and procedures.  

   Bingo!

   (This, BTW, is _absolutely_ typical of "representative" legislative
bodies. They either ignore principles (over time, at least) or they
mumble vague platitudes _intended_ to mean different things to different
people. The bureaucrats who enforce the legislation almost uniformly
disclaim that there _are_ any principles which matter.)

> Every situation is different.  So, IMO, it is important to provide
> the IESG with substantial discretion to determine the right types of
> mailing list control for each situation.  I believe that our current
> BCPs are much too restrictive in this regard.

   Margaret is absolutely right!

   And there _could_ be consensus to trust IESG with such discretion --
if we had the Principles straight.

> However, we also need to remember that these cases are highly
> emotionally charged, and often involve well-established IETF
> participants on one side, such as WG chairs and ADs, and less
> well-established participants on the other.

   Welcome to real-life...

> There are a lot of things that we hope that our WG chairs and
> mailing list administrators will try before considering a suspension
> of posting priveleges, such as meeting with the individual(s)
> involved and trying to work through the issues that are causing
> disruption.  ADs also tend to get involved in those discussions,
> and by the time an individual situation comes to the attention of the
> IESG, the WG chairs and ADs involved may be tired of the issue,
> frustrated or angry with the offending participant and/or impatient
> for action to be taken.

   Bingo!

   This is why most bodies create a procedure where such questions
go before a body of folks who were _not_ involved earlier, and expect
anyone who _was_ involved to recuse themselves.

> The involved ADs may also feel that a negative decision on the
> proposed action may be seen as insulting or insensitive to the WG
> chairs being affected by a participant's behaviour.

   ... which, in fact, it is. It's absolutely typical for the WGC
chair at that point to think (and perhaps say), "If you won't support
me, I'm outta here."

> It is not expected that the involved ADs will recuse themselves
> from discussion or voting on these issues,

   (While a practice of recusal would be good, I don't mean to propose
it, and I'm not at all sure it would help.)

> and it is quite possible (I don't think it has happened, but it
> could happen) for these factors to lead to a lynch mob mentality. 

   (I don't believe that has happened, either. But Margaret is right
to worry about the danger.)

> Because of the emotional nature of these situations, I think that
> we need some well-understood principles and processes to guide the
> actions of the IESG in these situations, and to provide some
> framework for appeals by the targets of these actions in the event
> that those principles and processes are violated.

   I agree (surprise!).

   But I'd really like to get across that IESG members should see this
-- not only because they're good people, but because Sam's proposal
would put them in a position which would detract from their ability
to accomplish their more-important functions.

> So, I think that the community needs to determine the right balance
> between defined processes and IESG discretion, and I personally
> think that this document errs too far on the side of complete IESG
> discretion than would be appropriate for a long term solution.

   Margaret doesn't say so, but I sense she may be wondering whether
Sam's proposal would _stay_ short-term. Listening to the GENAREA
meeting led me to believe other IESG members also wonder...

   I, to tell truth, do not believe it would stay short-term, though
I was willing to put a lot of work into trying to keep it so.

   But we don't need to seek consensus on that question. Even as a
short-term measure, Sam's proposal would saddle the IESG with
legislative responsibilities (which Harald, BTW, so correctly
pointed out we have never before saddled it with). _That_ is why
Sam's proposal is a bad idea.

   However distateful BCP83 indefinite-suspension may be, however
much DoS we must suffer from P-R action requests, however foolish
we may look arguing whether Jefsey is a "bad person", saddling an
already overworked IESG with legislative responsibilities is _not_
the right solution.

   (If nobody else will, I'm willing to do an I-D proposing an
experiment to restore the increasing-length suspensions we had
before BCP83.)

   Contrariwise, I'd be quite happy to start discussing Principles;
but I will restrain myself until I see an actual interest in such
a discussion.

--
John Leslie <[email-masked]>