Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-ecrit-framework

From: Cullen Jennings <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2010 20:00:03 -0800

Few small comments as part of my AD review. Typically I would have sent these before IETF Last Call but given the timing of the IESG calls and next IETF meeting, I decided we could sort them out as part of IETF Last Call. They are all small and could likely be fixed with RFC Editor notes after we decide what they need to say. 

6.2.1 Para 2. The statement that user provided location information is less accurate seems to be contradicted by the later statement that emergency responders will be dispatch to user self-declared location. I know what you are getting at here but seems like some words could be tightened up. 

Section 9.1 - para 1. Typo with the xref. 

Section 10. The text around the contact header and GRU does not seem right. Are contacts optional in an INVITE? a device with a global reachable IP can still use a GRU. When you say that the B2B contact manipulations should result in a contact header that is usable for call back it sounds like you are saying that current B2BUAs will all do this. Is that true or did it mean to say this can be a problem and they need to do this? The text here just seems to a a bit out of sync with the phone-bcp. Just have a look at this section and see if you think any changes are needed. 

Section 10. Use of PAI. Need to discuss how this works with anonymous call. Places like women's shelters, or many phones in some legal jurisdictions,  typically configure all calls to be anonymous in the 3325 sense yet it seems like they still need call back from emergency call to work. I also wonder about how the spec-T would work. If the solutions requires every service provider to have a spec-T with every psap, this does not seem feasible. How does the PAI not get removed when passing it to out of the domain of the service prover and too the psap? 

Section 14. 2nd para. At the time this was first written, this was true, however, at this point of time the IETF does have consensus about keying for SRTP. It seems that given that security is desirable, we should use the agreed on keying solution. 

Cullen <in my AD role>

On Feb 24, 2010, at 14:19 , The IESG wrote:

> The IESG has received a request from the Emergency Context Resolution 
> with Internet Technologies WG (ecrit) to consider the following document:
> 
> - 'Framework for Emergency Calling using Internet Multimedia '
>   <draft-ietf-ecrit-framework-10.txt> as an Informational RFC
> 
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final comments on this action.  Please send substantive comments to the
> [email-masked] mailing lists by 2010-03-10. Exceptionally, 
> comments may be sent to [email-masked] instead. In either case, please 
> retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
> 
> The file can be obtained via
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ecrit-framework-10.txt
> 
> 
> IESG discussion can be tracked via
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi?command=view_id&dTag=15438&rfc_flag=0
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