Subject: Make the Internet uncensorable to intermediate nodes

From: MtFBwU <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 21:59:44 +0800

Hi list,

I am an average Internet user from China. Sorry for my bad English. I have
this simple, naive or even stupid idea, thought I'd like to share in case
someone find it useful. I apologize if this topic is improper or spammy to
this maillist.

The Internet censorship in China makes many people suffer a lot, it also
makes me think a lot, both politically and technically. But I believe in
technology, especially the Internet.

In my opinion, theoretically, we *can* make the Internet uncensorable, at
least makes all intermediate nodes unable to censor anything. The TL;DR
answer is FEC algorithms.

To my knowledge, the Internet is designed as a tool to
deliver data end-to-end. But firewalls, gateways behave quite badly these
days. They judge the *content* of the data stream, and refuse to transfer
them if something is wrong, or cut off a connection in a middle of a
transfer. We invent SSL or other encryption methods to harden protection to
our *content*, makes it difficult to probe what's going on in the data, but
in my view, we have another cheap yet more effective, scalable way.

The idea is simple. Censorship happens, one of the reason is because our
most widely used transfer protocol is plaintext, another major reason is our
transfer is done in A SINGLE CONNECTION and can be check in a serialized
way.

What if we break our data to many parts first, the transfer the debris
nobody will notice, finally assemble them back to the original in the other
end? Before giving the data to gateways and routers, we split the data, in
sub-byte level, like doing a soft RAID5 to the data, then open multiple
concurrent parallel connections to deliver data.

For example a censorship system would cut off a connection if a keyword TEST
is triggered

ASCII: TEST
Connection1: 1110100 1100101 1110011 1110100

Now we pseudo split it. A real FEC, like RAID5 would be better

Connection 1: 00000000
Connection 2: 11111011
Connection 3: 10101110
Connection 4: 10011110

So what an intermediate nodes sees is continues pure binary data. No meaning
content.

Further more, each connection can be encrypted separately.

Because FEC has made data redundant in someway, so FEC-enabled protocol can
endure minor connection loss.

So if an intermediate node really want to check what's behind the data, it
has to find the way to restore information, other wise the guessing work
would be too painful.

FEC is better than encryptions. An encryption is either secure or broken.
Suppose a 10% redundant FEC, if we tunnel 50% of the connections through a
guaranteed secure tunnel like SSH, even if the intermediate nodes managed to
restore the other 50%, it only got half of each byte, which is still too few
to know what the original content is. Not to say the actual dispersal
methods are usually very short and can be secretly told in many ways.

My point is, today's Internet architecture can be very easily censored,
because the semantic content is bounded with data. FEC algorithms
can dispersal meaning-ful content into meaning-less data, thus makes the
transfer neutral to all intermediate nodes.

My view towards the Internet is simple, it's like the highways, is should be
publicly liber and neutral transportation no matter what your car model is.

What do you guys think?

---

From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 16:37:16 +0100

On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 09:59:44PM +0800,
 MtFBwU <[email-masked]> wrote 
 a message of 232 lines which said:

> What if we break our data to many parts first, the transfer the
> debris nobody will notice, finally assemble them back to the
> original in the other end?

It is used in several protocols, some of them widely implemented
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_(protocol)> on the Internet.

> For example a censorship system would cut off a connection if a
> keyword TEST is triggered

Such a censorship system would be quite stupid. We would not even need
complicated protocols to workaround it, just using synonyms or
euphemisms would suffice.

---

From: Joe Baptista <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 12:31:06 -0400

> euphemisms would suffice.

what an embarrassment you are. no people skills. no grace nor tact - which
we would expect from a French man.

try to be more helpful when people ask questions. don't use harsh words like
"stupid" or else you'll scare people away. thats not what we want at the
IETF. nes pas?

regards
joe baptista

---

From: Jerome Benoit <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 20:50:49 +0100

Le Fri, 19 Mar 2010 21:59:44 +0800,
MtFBwU <[email-masked]> a écrit :

> My point is, today's Internet architecture can be very easily
> censored, because the semantic content is bounded with data. FEC
> algorithms can dispersal meaning-ful content into meaning-less data,
> thus makes the transfer neutral to all intermediate nodes.
> 
> My view towards the Internet is simple, it's like the highways, is
> should be publicly liber and neutral transportation no matter what
> your car model is.
> 
> What do you guys think?

You can use : 

- An overlay that will encapsulate (and cypher) the censored
content within a "good looking" packet (I can think of a tor like
overlay). The pb with the overlay, it must change its signature
sometimes if DPI is used to filter;
- Maybe a tunnel (IP, SSL, SSH, etc.). I do not know which system is
used in China to filter ... maybe IPSec is forbidden. 

I really think the current Internet architecture make every filtering
system circumvented after : 

- Thinking about a way to trick the filter;
- Making use of the trick to achieve end-to-end data transport with
one of the standard transport protocol ... 

Cheers.  

-- 
Jérôme Benoit aka fraggle
La Météo du Net - http://grenouille.com
OpenPGP Key ID : 9FE9161D
Key fingerprint : 9CA4 0249 AF57 A35B 34B3 AC15 FAA0 CB50 9FE9 161D

---

From: Dave Aronson <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 21:56:15 -0400

On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 12:31, Joe Baptista <[email-masked]> wrote:

> On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 11:37 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer <[email-masked]> wrote:

>> Such a censorship system would be quite stupid.
...

> "stupid" or else you'll scare people away. thats not what we want at the

It's not quite as bad as you seem to think.  (And yes I realize I too
could be mistaken, about your thoughts.)  Stephane didn't call the
original poster's idea stupid, only the example that the OP used of a
censor to route around.  We've all had to use very simplistic examples
to illustrate a point.  (Though then again, all the more that Stephane
perhaps shouldn't have bothered with that particular comment!)

-Dave (no, not that one, the other one, no, the other other one)

-- 
Dave Aronson - Have Pun, Will Babble | Work: davearonson.com | /\ ASCII
-------------------------------------+ Play: davearonson.net | \/ Ribbon
"Specialization is for insects."     | Life: dare2xl.com     | /\ Campaign
-Robert A. Heinlein                  | Wife: nasjleti.net    | Email<>Web

---

From: Dave Aronson <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 22:21:46 -0400

On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 09:59, MtFBwU <[email-masked]> wrote:

> I am an average Internet user from China. Sorry for my bad English.

Actually, it seems fairly good to me.  Anybody who can understand, let
alone come up with, a username like yours, obviously has a pretty good
grasp of it.  :-)

> In my opinion, theoretically, we *can* make the Internet uncensorable,

In the large, it already essentially is.  Find one tiny little
pinhole, through which to leak something to somewhere free, and it
cannot be erased from the net as a whole.  (Note that said pinhole
need not be via the net!  Leak it on paper in a bottle, and someone
might find it and post it to the net.)  Anything from reports of
power-embarassing events, to the old goatse pix, are still available
SOMEwhere.

> The TL;DR answer is FEC algorithms.

Hmmm, interesting.  I'm not an info-theory wonk, but at first blush,
late on a Friday evening, this sounds plausible, to me.  As Stephane
points out, some of it is already popular.  It sounds like you want to
combine the diverse routing of BitTorrent (and ToR?), with some
steganography ("debris nobody will notice", possibly in non-user
data), and FEC to account for the possibility of some data being
blocked or altered.

What "prior art" research have you done?  What did you find, and why
wasn't it suitable?  What do you see as the already available building
blocks, or concepts to extend?

-Dave

---

From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 14:53:10 -0400

Some of the censorship schemes in place are actually quite trivial.
And in some cases the issue is not one of controlling information but
saving face.

Tor provides a reasonably effective bypass system, probably as good as
you can expect on an online scheme.

The resistance in Cuba uses USB thumb drives to transport information.
Looking at ways to improve the use of such drives is likely to produce
a more effective counter-censorship scheme.

On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 11:37 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer <[email-masked]> wrote:
> _______________________________________________
> Ietf mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
>

-- 
-- 
New Website: http://hallambaker.com/
View Quantum of Stupid podcasts, Tuesday and Thursday each week,
http://quantumofstupid.com/

---

From: Greg Daley <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 17:24:01 +1100

Dear MtFBwU,

Please excuse my weasel words.

My country is apparently about to adopt an internet censorship scheme.
I'm not happy about it, but I'm unlikely to build a system to circumvent the
"protection".

I would actually not encourage IETF to work on such a technology as this,
particularly in the lead-up to IETF Beijing.  That would be a serious affront
to our hosts.  It is quite important to ensure that the IETF particularly is not
subject to any external party's agenda in the lead-up to the meeting.

In purely technical terms, there is a conflict with IETF's existing
routing practices which are shortest (routing) path oriented, so that
communications between pairs of devices will send most or all channels
of data down the same path.

Any form of communications which sends multiple elements down the same routing
path is subject to collation and correlation by an intermediate agency, assuming
that they use the same correlation mechanisms as the end-nodes.

So that means using diverse data paths, or creating some sort of protected
payload is required to ensure that only the parties to a conversation can
receive the data.

If there is a portion of the data which can be exchanged out-of-band, then a 
protection scheme can be negotiated there, or the sensitive content can be sent with
the remnant providing only innocuous context.

Alternatively, a system which can send data out-of-band  which the parties
can use to shuffle the data so that sensitivity is reduced.

In some environments use of such shuffle techniques and out-of-band channels is
not legal, and I wouldn't encourage anyone to act illegally.  

Out-of-band communications schemes such as have been mentioned are likely to be
focussed on by authorities.  Participation in particular schemes could get someone in
trouble.

Systems which increase the apparent entropy of a communication path could even be detected,
and local endpoints (for example within a protected zone) could be identified based
on the increased entropy.

This would be dangerous for the participants, especially if they thought that
the channel they had was unidentifiable.

IETF's job is to make Standards, which are reliable, stable and widely available.
Regardless of the focus of a protocol (routing, privacy or reliability), it's not
sufficient to create a system which is good-enough for today, but could be
dangerously ineffective tomorrow.

I believe this is something which is not something IETF should rush into willy nilly,
ideology of participants aside.

Sincerely,

Greg Daley

---

From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 09:26:53 +0100

On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 09:56:15PM -0400,
 Dave Aronson <[email-masked]> wrote 
 a message of 29 lines which said:

> Stephane didn't call the original poster's idea stupid, only the
> example that the OP used of a censor to route around.

More interesting (it can even be regarded as an Usenet and Internet
law) is the fact that people protesting loudly that "X should be nicer
with Y" never steps in to help Y or even to answer his question...

---

From: Alessandro Vesely <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 13:04:52 +0100

On 19/Mar/10 14:59, MtFBwU wrote:
> The Internet censorship in China makes many people suffer a lot, it also makes me think a lot, both politically and technically. But I believe in technology, especially the Internet.

I hope IETF's meeting in Beijing will be one more occasion to restate 
that people's intelligence is humanity's primary asset. However, I'm 
not sure technology can prevent corrupted managers and governors from 
offending it.

> In my opinion, theoretically, we *can* make the Internet uncensorable, at least makes all intermediate nodes unable to censor anything. The TL;DR answer is FEC algorithms.

I'm afraid your idea won't easily become a practical way to improve 
network neutrality. IPv6 and SCTP bring somewhat equivalent change, 
and their lack of adoption is significant. (TLS has seen more luck, 
and I'd go for it.)

---

From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 09:29:39 -0400

If upsetting the hosts was a consideration then we should cancel
Beijing. But is isn't so we shouldn't.

No, the real reason not to build anti-censorship schemes into the
standards is that it is doomed to failure. From a technical point of
view, there are three types of censorship. The first is the type the
Internet is highly resistant to. It is not possible for any one
country to dominate the Internet and control what is visible in the
territory of another. The second is control of the borders of a
territory. The third, control within a territory. The second two are
something the Internet can't address as a structural issue.

We can deploy a censorship-proof Internet in the parts where
governments share our objectives. We do not dominate the Internet, we
cannot force governments with counter objectives to allow deployment
of the censorship-proofing technology.

Counter-censorship within a territory where the censor controls the
infrastructure requires tactical measures. The problem with tactics is
that they only work so long as they are a surprise. With all due
respect to MtFBwU, I would hope that he would want us to avoid giving
away information to the opposition.

---

From: Dave Aronson <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 15:11:06 -0400

On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 09:29, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email-masked]> wrote:

> standards is that it is doomed to failure.

Agreed.  However, it could still be useful towards that aim, on a
small-group scale, to have a communications protocol (or suite
thereof) that would be *resistant* to censorship, at least of the
kinds currently common.  Most likely, something that would serve as a
carrier for something else -- and be more inconspicuous than IPsec.
Maybe something that an IPsec tunnel could be hidden in, with stego,
splitting, random onion routing, and recombination?  Or maybe a suite
of protocols each aimed at one of these, with ability to combine (or
rather, nothing preventing combination)?

-Dave (the other other one)

---

From: Christian Huitema <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 20:35:51 +0000

> carrier for something else -- and be more inconspicuous than IPsec.

IPsec is only conspicuous because it is not used very much. In fact, that was the whole point Phil Zimmerman was making with respect to encryption. You want everybody using encryption for all sorts of things, otherwise the few who use it because they really have something to hide will be "conspicuous."

-- Christian Huitema

---

From: Eliot Lear <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 13:39:31 -0700

On 3/22/10 1:35 PM, Christian Huitema wrote:
> IPsec is only conspicuous because it is not used very much.

???

It's used throughout industry for VPN technology.  And where it's not 
used, TLS is used.  Is TLS conspicuous?

Eliot

---

From: Joel Jaeggli <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 13:43:06 -0700

> used, TLS is used.  Is TLS conspicuous?

on ports other than 25 443 465 587 993 995 maybe....

---

From: Dean Willis <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 16:39:43 -0500

> subject to any external party's agenda in the lead-up to the meeting.

How about being subject to an internal agenda, like making the Internet
available to people who are suffering under repressive regimes?

Obligatoy protest: And given the Google debacle, why are we still going
to Beijing?

--
Dean

---

From: todd glassey <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 16:18:38 -0700

> Obligatoy protest: And given the Google debacle, why are we still going

Because the IETF is about creating Intellectual Properties regarding
networksing. Not a Political Action Committee...

Todd

---

From: Mark Atwood <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 20:16:25 -0700

On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 11:24 PM, Greg Daley <[email-masked]>wrote:

> to our hosts.

By "as this", you are referring to both technologies such as "Tor", and also
similarly useful technologies as IPsec, VPNs, and Secure Shell, all of which
are useful and are used today to "Make the Internet uncensorable to
intermediate nodes".

The Chinese government seem to be excessively affrontable, and entirely too
many westerners are enablers of this.  It's insulting, by western standards.
 If "the west" has to worry about insulting "China", then "China" can get a
clue about being insulting to "the west". The Chinese government can grow a
thicker skin.

..m

---

From: Greg Daley <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 16:05:42 +1100

Hi Mark, 
 
You are incorrect.  I am not referring to IPSec, VPNs or Secure Shell.
I am not even referring to TOR (I don't put the solution before the problem).

I am referring to the goal:
1) Unsnoopable
2) Untraceable

The set {IPSec, VPNs, SecSH} meet only the first of these.

There is a functional difference between IETF continuing to work on 
protocols associated with 1), which there is a commercial need for today, 
and embarking upon standardizing protocols which address 1) and 2),
for which the purpose is political.

I am not opposed to this work.

Does it have to be standardized, and does it have to be IETF?

With regard to affronting hosts, I would think that anyone who visited
a home or a country would behave politely.

I am always polite and respectful of people in the USA when I visit, and
understand it is a privilege (as a non-Citizen) to be there.  

My message alluded to the fact that there are different patterns of 
politeness in many East Asian countries.   One of the issues is that
politicising IETF work would put our peers in China in an untenable 
position with regard to the authorities.  

These are the people we are going to China to engage with and encourage.

The people you may be angry with are not these people.

Please take the political activism somewhere else, where it will be more
effective. 

Sincerely,

Greg Daley

________________________________

	From: Mark Atwood [mailto:[email-masked]] 
	Sent: Wednesday, 24 March 2010 2:16 PM
	To: Greg Daley
	Cc: MtFBwU; [email-masked]
	Subject: Re: Make the Internet uncensorable to intermediate nodes

	On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 11:24 PM, Greg Daley <[email-masked]> wrote:

	By "as this", you are referring to both technologies such as "Tor", and also similarly useful technologies as IPsec, VPNs, and Secure Shell, all of which are useful and are used today to "Make the Internet uncensorable to intermediate nodes".

	The Chinese government seem to be excessively affrontable, and entirely too many westerners are enablers of this.  It's insulting, by western standards.  If "the west" has to worry about insulting "China", then "China" can get a clue about being insulting to "the west". The Chinese government can grow a thicker skin.

	..m

---

From: Alessandro Vesely <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 09:25:54 +0100

> networksing. Not a Political Action Committee...

That's the worst definition of the IETF I've ever heard! I don't 
believe that, and don't think ISOC believes that either.

---

From: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 03:38:46 -0500

For what it's worth...

> That's the worst definition of the IETF I've ever heard! I don't believe 
> that, and don't think ISOC believes that either.

I would assume that if ISOC thought we were doing something besides the 
mission described in http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3935.txt, that RFC 
wouldn't still be BCP 95...

Spencer

---

From: Alessandro Vesely <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 16:44:36 +0100

> wouldn't still be BCP 95...

Yeah,

   The Internet isn't value-neutral, and neither is the IETF.  We want
   the Internet to be useful for communities that share our commitment
   to openness and fairness.

Also, I'd never have guessed that the "IP" thing regarding networking 
that the IETF is about could be "Intellectual Property".

-- 
Did You Say “Intellectual Property”? It's a Seductive Mirage
by Richard M. Stallman  http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/not-ipr.html

---

From: todd glassey <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 10:50:35 -0700

On 3/24/2010 8:44 AM, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
>   The Internet isn't value-neutral, and neither is the IETF. 

AMEN!

> We want

But the IETF is not open to opinions which vary from its core stated
opinion, and that is constrained by the people speaking for the IETF as
a whole. Its one of the key flaws in giving a technologist a voice
beyond being a technologist. As to fairness BULL SH*T. The IETF is
anything but fair or open in form.
> that the IETF is about could be "Intellectual Property".

Then what is an IETF Standard? - it is pure intellectual property and
the refusal by the IETF to embrace that is one of the issues the IETF faces.

Todd

---

From: Alessandro Vesely <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 20:25:50 +0100

On 24/Mar/10 18:50, todd glassey wrote:
> a whole.

What about its legendary "rough consensus"? If I trust what the IETF 
says about itself --as we all should-- it /is/ open to varying 
opinions. I'm talking of RFCs, not specific arrangements for IETF 79.

> Its one of the key flaws in giving a technologist a voice beyond being a technologist.

Yup, the political relevance of technology has been debated since 
ancient Greece, and before.

> As to fairness BULL SH*T. The IETF is anything but fair or open in form.

If it is not, then that's a defect that we (Internet users) should 
actively amend. Note that the same is true for the Chinese government 
w.r.t. its people. The difference is that the Internet is "one of the 
greatest political forces in history", in your own words [1].

-- 
[1] http://www.icannatlarge.com/glassey.html

---

From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 00:26:49 -0400

It is an interesting fact that China has been hacking into US systems
since the 1980s and that Clinton is the first Secretary of State to
have made any form of complaint about the practice.

Meanwhile, the US put out a policy document back in 2001 that
essentially said 'we will bury you in cyberspace'.

Until very recently it was by no means certain what the international
response should be to cyber espionage. Espionage is not warfare, not
is it necessarily damaging to the interests of a country to be spied
on. Reliable exchange of information can lead to stability.

The US does not have grounds to take offense for a practice that it
had previously tolerated for 30 years without complaint. Still less
does the IETF.

As to why the IETF is visiting. I would suggest that it is because the
Chinese government has extended an invitation. The PRC has expressed
concern about the 'dominance' of certain states over information
infrastructures on numerous occasions, including in international
treaties. Hosting a meeting is an affirmative step that the PRC can
take to encourage greater participation.

---

From: MtFBwU <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2010 13:18:18 +0800

On a second thought, why don't we change the angle of this subject?

Nowadays, dual ISP are pretty common. I may have a cable from Verizon
broadband and a wireless connection from AT&T at the same time. Now
suppose I want to run a bandwidth-demanding online service,
OnLive<http://www.onlive.com/> for example, let's say it requires a
10mbps connection, my cable and my wireless each has only a 6mbps
connection.

Can I *combine* the speed of these two connections as one so I can use OnLive?

I think it's a legit problem IETF need to address. If there are more
and more ISP and connection availability due to advance of technology,
people will always seek for a way to exploit a combination potential
of full bandwidth.

Now, anti-censorship is only a by product of the protocol. We can
create a virtual ISP in a single ISP connection, but it's *hard* to
surveillance or censor.

I mistakenly replied to Dave alone not to the list, sorry. So here's
what I previously said few days ago:

On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 11:27 AM, MtFBwU <[email-masked]> wrote:
> Thanks for all the replies
>> Such a censorship system would be quite stupid. We would not even
>> need complicated protocols to workaround it, just using synonyms
>> or euphemisms would suffice.
> Haha, very true indeed. Now let me tell you a real story
> China blocked youtube right? First it does DNS tamper, so I setup a local
> DNS server, forward 8.8.8.8 using TCP would solve the problem.
> Then the Great Firewall (G.F.W.) do URL blocking, it concatenate the HOST
> header and the GET strings together then judge if your HTTP query is
> unwelcome. I have also discovered a way to bypass it, we can actually use a
> double or multiple space after GET like
> GET    / HTTP/1.1
> HOST: www.youtube.com
> I can get partial return of HTML. Because sadly, the last block, DPI checkes
> this string
> <title>YouTube - Broadcast Yourself.</title>
> It would RST you in the middle of a transport. So I can only load HTML up to
> the title part
> So really, fighting against censorship is a two-way game. Yes we can
> use synonyms or euphemisms in domestic communications, we can do double
> thinking, but the real problem is we can not ask the other end like youtube
> or google to change its fingerprints regularly and accordingly to
> each censorship. We have to and we can solve the problem in a lower level,
> once and for all.
>
>> he resistance in Cuba uses USB thumb drives to transport
>> information. Looking at ways to improve the use of such drives is likely to
>> produce a more effective counter-censorship scheme.
> You see, the G.F.W is in fact, under a lot of pressure. Evidence shows that
> China use a massive cluster of Shuguang 4000L super computer farm to do the
> censorship job, if we have a FEC-like protocol, along with multiple
> BitTorrent downloading sessions simultaneously open on each client, then the
> censorship would not work properly. In the past we have encountered GFW
> failure from time to time, because it was during the evening where Internet
> activity peaks in China.
> In this real-time web world, using USB thumb would be too slow for important
> information spreading. :P
>
> I am very sorry, I know IETF is a place where people discuss technical
> details, but currently I do not have that comprehensive knowledge to go any
> futther. As a user, this thread is more like just a suggestion to you guys,
> if there will be an important protocol to be designed for the future, please
> consider making it to be intermediate node agnostic.
> On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 10:21 AM, Dave Aronson <[email-masked]>
> wrote:
>>

---

From: jean-michel bernier de portzamparc <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2010 17:00:05 +0100

Is that not  an application of "ISP rotation" with random sending of packets
possibly made of random byte parts?
Portzamparc

2010/3/27 MtFBwU <[email-masked]>