I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's

ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the

IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the

security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat

these comments just like any other last call comments.

The Security Consideration section points to the security consideration

of the ietf-pim-rfc4601bis document, which seems reasonable as this document 

adds new attribute to the existing PIM Join message.

The document then states the following:

"In order to minimize the risk of a malicious node injecting an incorrect

Explicit RPF vector stack, it should be used within a single management

domain."

You might want to elaborate a bit on how does a single management domain

help minimize this risk.

Also, the security consideration section in ietf-pim-rfc4601bis document

discusses the impact of a forget Join message and its implication on the

multicast traffic. You might want to add some text to explain if this new

attribute, defined in this document, changes the implication of a forged

Join message or not; if it does, you might want to explain how.

Regards,

 Rifaat