Security review of Redacted Fields in the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Response draft-ietf-regext-rdap-redacted-14 Do not be alarmed. I generated this review of this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written with the intent of improving security requirements and considerations in IETF drafts. Comments not addressed in last call may be included in AD reviews during the IESG review. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. The Registration Data Access Protocol carries information about DNS registrants. The server might choose to withhold some data based on its access policies, particularly for privacy. This document describes a redaction method in which the server explicitly states in the response which data fields or data values were redacted. The method has a clear disadvantage mentioned in the security considerations: it can leak field identifiers that might not apply to all users. For private information, this can have serious implications. The security considerations offer the option to simply omit, without note, fields that are sensitive. This might be done if the provider wants to conceal the sorts of metadata that it keeps about users, but concealment should be done for sensitive information (e.g., "criminal record", "amex credit card", etc. [silly examples used for illustrative purposes]). Transparency would require the server to have a published policy saying which data is sensitive and whether or not it will be explicitly redacted or silently omitted. Note that if the data structure is publicly known, then silent omission is pointless. There are some issues about information flow that should be carefully considered when writing such a policy. For example, I assume that it is obvious that if the server has an empty field, then that information is still redacted if the policy is "redact". I think that the security consideration section needs amplification in light of the possibility of leaking sensitive data. Hilarie