I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. This document is describing extensions to a routing infrastructure. As such the only security properties that are reasonably achievable without inappropriate assumptions such as trustworthy routing nodes is to assure continuity of service. We should assume that authentication and confidentiality of the message content are assured via some end-to-end means where the ends are the source and destination of the messages. [It would be rather useful if the IAB would draft a document that would state what security properties are expected at which level] ESADI does provide for improved service assurances by allowing the authentication of nodes. What is less clear is how this authentication is leveraged Section 5.1 suggests that authenticating endpoints permits higher confidence to be built up. if end nodes are authenticated to their MAC address. But this authentication only has value if there is a chain of custody authentication to the relying party. Section 6.2 describes a mechanism that might be relevant here. A pointer would be helpful. -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/